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ABSTRACT
This article advocates for expanding general personal jurisdiction
over transnational corporations so that where Congress has provided for
a cause of action for extraterritorial violations of law, such as in the area
of human rights and terrorism,, victims have an opportunity to obtain a
remedy. The article discusses the history of general personal jurisdiction
over corporations, the recent decisions of Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, and Daimler AG v. Bauman and their impact
on victims' ability to obtain a remedy for extraterritorial business-related
human rights violations, and recommends that Congress enact a statute
requiring that transnational corporations doing business in the United
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States consent to the general personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts in those
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INTRODUCTION
In the recent cases of Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown,' and Daimler AG v. Bauman,2 the U.S. Supreme Court created a
sea change by severely limiting general personal jurisdiction' over
transnational corporations (TNCs).4  For decades prior to these cases,
most lower courts relied on the 1945 case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washingtons in asserting general personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation whenever the defendant corporation had engaged in
"sufficiently substantial continuous activity"6 in the U.S. state where the
claim was brought (forum state), often characterizing such as
"continuous and systematic"7 activity. In Goodyear and Daimler, the
1. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
2. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
3. General personal jurisdiction exists where a defendant has sufficiently
substantial contacts with a state to allow that state's courts, or a federal court sitting in
that state, to assert jurisdiction over the defendant, even where the cause of action is
unrelated to a defendant's contacts with the state. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121,
1172, 1179 (1966); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. Specific jurisdiction exists where the
defendant has sufficient contacts with the State, and the cause of action arises from, or is
related to, those contacts. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. This Article primarily concerns
general personal jurisdiction, but does discuss briefly, infra Part IIB, the narrowing of
specific jurisdiction over corporations.
4. I adopt the definition of a TNC set forth by United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development: "Transnational corporations (TNCs) are incorporated or
unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates. A
parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in
countries other than its home country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake."
Transnational corporations (TNC), U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEv., http://unctad.
org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-corporations-(TNC).aspx (last visited October 17,
2016). The term should be considered synonymous with transnational businesses or
multinational corporations (MNCs).
5. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. Id. at 321. The Court also used the phrase "activity so substantial and of such a
nature to justify" general personal jurisdiction. Id. at 318.
7. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 925. See also lower cases so holding, infra Part I.C, and
noting that many courts continued to use the term "systematic and continuous business,"
even though International Shoe used the term "so substantial and of such a nature to
justify" general personal jurisdiction. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
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Court held that even where a corporation conducts continuous and
systematic business activity in the United States, a U.S. court cannot
assert general personal jurisdiction over it consistent with the Due
Process Clause unless the corporation is essentially "at home" in the
forum state. Under Daimler, in nearly all circumstances, this will mean
the corporation must be headquartered or incorporated in the forum
state.9
Among other potential implications of this jurisdictional
limitation,'0  it will severely impact the ability of victims of
extraterritorial business-related human rights violations to seek a remedy
for the violations." Because of Goodyear and Daimler, victims of
extraterritorial business-related human rights violations will find it nearly
impossible to seek a remedy in the United States against a TNC involved
in the violation if the TNC is not headquartered or incorporated in the
United States, even though it may well be doing significant business in
the United States. This is true even where Congress has seen fit to
provide for a cause of action over these extraterritorial claims, such as
through the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 12 the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA),"
8. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918-19; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751
(2014).
9. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. The Court does note that there might be an otherwise
exceptional circumstance. Id. at 761 n.19.
10. There will be implications of these decisions in many other areas of
accountability, including securities, foreign corruption, etc. For a discussion on such
potential implications, see generally Aaron Simowitz, Legislating Transnational
Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2017).
11. In addition to restrictions on general personal jurisdiction, two other fairly
universal doctrines contribute to preventing victims of extraterritorial human rights
violations from seeking justice in the courts of the United States: limits on subject matter
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct under the ATS in light of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petrol., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), and the limited liability of parent corporations for acts of
their subsidiaries. For discussion regarding the limitations of subject matter jurisdiction
and shareholder limited liability, see Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing
Access to Judicial Remedies for Corporate Accountability for Violations of International
Human Rights Norms by Transnational Corporations in a New (Post-Kiobel) World,
46 COLUM. HUM. RMs. L. REV. 158, 169-73 (2014) (addressing, inter alia, subject matter
jurisdiction) [hereinafter Skinner, Beyond Kiobel], and Gwynne L. Skinner, Rethinking
Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries' Violations of
International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1769 (2015) (addressing
limited liability of parent corporations) [hereinafter Skinner, Rethinking Limited
Liability].
12. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The Supreme Court held that the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute, but that when Congress enacted the ATS it did so with the
understanding that courts would use their common law power to recognize such claims.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712, 724 (2004). As discussed in more detail
infra Part II.A, the Supreme Court in Kiobel limited the extraterritorial application of the
ATS to those claims that "touch and concern" the United States.
13. Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332-33 (2012).
620 [Vol. 121:3
EXPANDING GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 14 and even where
the TNC gains significant economic benefit by conducting business in
the United States. Narrow jurisdiction will greatly impact such victims
because several of the host countries where TNCs operate, and where
many of the worst human rights and environmental abuses occur, have
weak, ineffective, or corrupt judicial systems, and thus, victims cannot
obtain a remedy in the host country where the harm occurred.'5 Rather,
if victims have any hope for a remedy, they often have no choice but to
file a lawsuit outside of their own country. As discussed below, for
many years, victims could bring such claims in U.S. courts under the
Alien Tort Statute.
This Article, then, addresses the current trend in the United States16
of limiting general personal jurisdiction' over TNCs that operate
extraterritorially and argues that such narrow jurisdiction is inconsistent
with the growth of transnational businesses, and the way in which they
are structured and operate. Moreover, the narrowing will result in
victims of business-related human rights abuses being left without a
remedy, even as the offending TNCs gain significant economic
advantage by operating in host countries where the harm occurred, as
14. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012). The Statute read
in relevant part, "an individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a
civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or
should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate
district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys
fees." Id.
15. See Christen Broecker, Note, "Better the Devil You Know": Home State
Approaches to Transnational Corporate Accountability, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
159, 184-85 (2008); Brittany T. Cragg, Comment, Home is Where the Halt Is:
Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility Through Home State Regulation and Social
Disclosure, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 735, 751-55 (2010); Erin Foley Smith, Right to
Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non Conveniens: Opening U.S. Courts to
Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 44 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 145, 156-58
(2010).
16. Although outside the scope of this Article, similar personal jurisdictional limits
exist in much of Europe. See generally Council Regulation 1215/2012 (recast), 2012 O.J.
(L 351) (EU) [hereinafter Brussels I recast]. Most of Europe, including the EU, does not
make a distinction between personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction in the
same way that the United States does and jurisdiction is not a matter of constitutional
doctrine, but is purely statutory. See Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro:
Observations from a Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REv. 591,
612 (2012). In Europe, jurisdictional rules focus both on the domicile of the defendant
and on the type of claim being brought, with different jurisdictional rules applying in
different types of cases and depending on who is bringing the claim. See id.; see Brussels
I recast, at pmbl. 13, 15; see also id. at art. 4. Although there are no constitutional
limitations on personal jurisdiction under EU regulations, the reasons for some
jurisdictional limitations are based on notions of fairness-similar to the U.S.
jurisprudential focus on due process rights of defendants. Id. at pmbl. 1, 3. .
6212017]
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well as in countries that severely limit personal jurisdiction over them,
which now includes the United States. Given the complexities of
corporate structures, and the often overwhelming barriers victims face
when seeking remedies for corporate-related human rights abuses,
countries where TNCs engage in business, such as the United States,
should be expanding general personal jurisdiction over transnational
corporate entities, not narrowing such jurisdiction.
Thus, this Article proposes that the United States broaden general
personal jurisdiction over TNCs that do business in the United States so
that victims of business-related human rights violations have a chance at
a remedy pursuant to existing (and potentially future) causes of action,
which in the human rights context often includes claims involving
extraterritorial conduct. The Article suggests that the most expedient
way for this to occur is for the U.S. Congress to enact a statute
specifically requiring that TNCs "doing business" in the United States
consent to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts in those instances
where Congress has provided a cause of action for extraterritorial
conduct, including the ATS.17 As discussed in more detail infra Part
VI.A, Congress could define "doing business" in a number of ways.
Congress has the power to enact such a statute under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.18
Part I of the Article briefly describes the evolution of general
personal jurisdiction over transnational corporations in the United States.
It notes how U.S. courts adapted general personal jurisdiction to meet the
problems posed by businesses through their expansion across state lines
and internationally early in the 1900s in order to ensure fairness and
justice for victims of business-related harm. This Part also discusses the
1945 case International Shoe, which although limited courts' assertion of
personal jurisdiction over corporations, still seemingly allowed such
assertions of general personal jurisdiction where a corporation engaged
in substantial continuous activity. Part II discusses how the "continuous
and systematic" test courts derived from International Shoe for asserting
general personal jurisdiction allowed victims of business-related human
rights abuses to file suit against TNCs for such harms in U.S. courts after
the reemergence of the Alien Tort Statute in the early 1980s. Part III
17. As mentioned, supra note 12, Congress did not specifically enact a cause of
action in the ATS, but provided for subject matter jurisdiction over torts in violation of
the law of nations. However, Congress did so with the understanding that providing such
jurisdiction would enable courts to use their common law powers to recognize such
claims. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. In this way, Congress "provided for" a cause of action
within the meaning of this Article.
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations").
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discusses Goodyear and Daimler's narrowing of general personal
jurisdiction over TNCs, as well as the related narrowing of specific
jurisdiction in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.19  It also
discusses the Court's narrowing of subject matter jurisdiction for
extraterritorial human rights violations in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum20 in 2013, but notes that ATS claims are alive and well.
Part IV discusses Goodyear's and Daimler 's implications, including
the implication of limiting victims of extraterritorial human rights abuses
from seeking and obtaining a remedy against these transnational
corporations in U.S. courts. It also discusses the decisions' effect on
other claims, such as claims brought for terrorism-related violations.
This Part also compares the limiting of general personal jurisdiction over
corporations to that of courts' ability to assert jurisdiction over
individuals who are served while within the court's jurisdiction-known
as "tag" jurisdiction 2-noting the unfairness of this scheme.
Part V of the Article discusses why such narrow general personal
jurisdiction over transnational businesses is unjust and why Congress
should address the problem. This Part discusses the enormous financial
and tax benefits corporations receive from operating in developing "host
countries," yet all the while, nonconsenting victims are forced to absorb
nearly all the costs of harm. Moreover, such victims are typically unable
to seek a remedy in the courts of their own countries, for a variety of
reasons. They are also often unable to seek remedy in Europe against
corporations domiciled there for a variety of reasons, including lack of
causes of action and the existence of loser pay rules, which makes being
able to bring claims in the United States even more important. This Part
also describes that today transnational businesses are so complex in their
structure and operations that narrow personal jurisdiction no longer is
fair or justifiable. Finally, this Part also notes the enormous amount of
business and direct investment of foreign transnational companies in the
United States as a reason why expanding general personal jurisdiction
over such transnational businesses in the United States is fair.
Part VI proposes the specific solution: that Congress enact a law
allowing U.S. courts to assert general personal jurisdiction over all TNCs
and other entities2 2 "doing business" in the United States where Congress
has seen fit to provide a cause of action for extraterritorial conduct.
Although it may be possible for states to do this as well, given the
19. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
20. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
21. See infra note 220.
22. Other entities would include Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), some of
which have been alleged to be involved in funding terrorism. See discussion infra Part
IV.A, involving the NGO Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), as an example.
2017] 623
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possible limitations of the Commerce Clause,23 federalism, and the
foreign affairs doctrine, it is more expedient and feasible for Congress to
enact such legislation, which it is empowered to do under the Commerce
Clause. Such legislation would provide non-domestic corporations fair
notice of general jurisdiction for these claims, primarily human rights,
terrorism, and trafficking claims, among potentially others. Moreover,
"doing business" would include the existence of a subsidiary in the
United States through which the parent engages in the business of the
enterprise. Although not a focus of this Article, this Part also suggests
that Europe and Canada take similar action with regard to TNCs
operating within their jurisdiction where a cause of action for
24extraterritorial conduct exists.
Part VI also argues that expanding personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations doing business in the jurisdiction would create an even
playing field for the United States businesses because most transnational
businesses, wherever such are incorporated, would be equally subject to
suits under federal law, not just U.S. companies. This Part concludes by
addressing comity and foreign relations concerns, noting that while such
concerns are legitimate, they are likely overstated.
I. EVOLUTION OF U.S. COURTS' GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS.
Much has been written about the history of personal jurisdiction, as
well as the changing justifications for constitutional limitations on
personal jurisdiction (i.e., state sovereignty vs. constitutional due
23. See discussion infra Part V; see also Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra
Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 207, 261-62 (2014) (noting that some courts question whether states can require
such consent from foreign corporations under the Dormant Commerce Clause)
[hereinafter Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction];
Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C.L. REV.
529, 550-51 (1991) (noting concerns of state's inability to require consent under the
Commerce Clause) [hereinafter Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box].
24. See Brussels I recast, supra note 16, at pmbl. 14; id. at ch. II, § 1, art. 6. For
corporations not domiciled in an EU country, each country in Europe has its own
jurisdictional laws that govern such entities, and personal jurisdiction over such non-EU
corporations ranges and can be quite broad. Id.
In Canada, jurisdiction is broader than it now exists in the United States post-
Daimler. See Club Resorts, Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 (Can.) (explaining
that jurisdiction over out-of-province or out-of-country defendants is based on whether
the foreign corporation has a "real and substantial connection" to Canada (and the
province asserting jurisdiction)); see also Caroline Davidson, Tort Au Canadien: A
Proposal For Canadian Tort Legislation on Gross Violations of International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1403, 1437-38 (2005).
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process), and that history will not be repeated in detail here.25 However,
a summary of the history of the evolution of personal jurisdiction over
25. See, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939)
(describing the "long, tortuous evolution" of personal jurisdiction precedent with respect
to corporations as a "history of judicial groping for a reconciliation between the practical
position achieved by the corporation in society and a natural desire to confine the[ir]
powers"). Although impossible to list all the writings regarding the history and changing
justifications, some of the more frequently cited and influential articles include Patrick J.
Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law ofPersonal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer
to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 19, 23-25 (1990) (arguing that
Pennoyer was not intended to make personal jurisdiction a constitutional law issue, but
rather that personal jurisdiction is better regulated through legislators and Congress); Lea
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 721, 782-83
(1988) (arguing that direct affiliations, such as domicile or principle place of business,
are sufficient contacts to subject a defendant to both adjudicative and legislative general
jurisdiction); Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX.
L. REv. 1589, 1592 (1992) (arguing that the International Shoe requirement for
establishing personal jurisdiction in federal question cases should be satisfied by proving
a basis of contacts within the U.S. as a whole, rather than focusing on contacts within a
specific state); Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv. 257, 265-67 (1990) (arguing that the evolution of personal jurisdiction is
linked to major political and social events in U.S. history, and that after each event,
personal jurisdiction has helped the People understand the roles of the federal
government and the states by testing their limits); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths
of State Sovereignty and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal
Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 726-27 (1983) (arguing that the purpose of
personal jurisdiction is to protect an individual's constitutional rights, rather than
protecting a state's interest, which means personal jurisdiction can be waived, consented
or estopped); Wendy Collins Perdue, What's "Sovereignty" Got to Do with It? Due
Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REv. 729, 740-43
(2012) (describing that personal jurisdiction has changed from evaluating a state's
sovereign power to adjudicate a case to ensuring that the defendant's liberty interest is
not violated; and arguing that a new approach to personal jurisdiction must be adopted as
sovereignty and federalism no longer function); Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the
Beetle in the Box, supra note 23, at 529-34 (describing the history of personal jurisdiction
in the United States, and noting that every few years, the Court's description of personal
jurisdiction is inconsistent with its recent prior precedent); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin,
Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer
Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479, 503-08, 519-20(1987) (providing an in-depth
analysis of Pennoyer v. Neff and substantive due process); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes,
Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 807, 887-902, 919-20 (2004)
(describing general jurisdiction's framework; and arguing that current approaches to
general jurisdiction are deficient); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REv. 689, 738-60 (1987)
(describing that theories of personal jurisdiction and the due process clause are not
linked, and arguing that a state's sovereign immunity and a defendant's liberty interest
need to be connected when determining 'fairness' for asserting jurisdiction); Mary
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REv. 610, 629-36, 680-81
(1988) (describing that the concepts of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction have
strayed from their original meaning, and arguing that the broadest meaning of specific
jurisdiction should be adopted and that general jurisdiction should be restricted to cases
that are truly dispute-blind); and von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1164-79
(describing why general and specific jurisdictions are better terms than in personam, in
2017] 625
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corporations is important in understanding how we arrived at where we
are today, with limited general personal jurisdiction over transnational
corporations after Goodyear and Daimler.
A. Early U.S. History of General Jurisdiction Over Corporations
Early in our country's history, whether a court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant was based simply on whether the
court was able to physically enforce a judgment against the defendant-
i.e., power over the defendant or his property.26 Thus, courts could assert
jurisdiction over a defendant where the defendant was "found" and
served.27 Courts could assert jurisdiction over an individual not
domiciled in the state, as long as he was found in the state and served
there.2 8
However, courts could assert jurisdiction over corporations only in
their state of incorporation because a corporation was not seen as having
a legal existence outside the boundaries of the state where it was
created.2 9 A corporation could not "migrate" to another sovereign state
for purposes of jurisdiction or otherwise.3 0 Similarly, service on an
individual officer outside of the state of incorporation was typically not
valid because corporate .officers were thought to lose their official
character representing the corporation as soon as they left the state of
rem, and quasi in rem, and arguing that in the future, specific jurisdiction will be the
prominent approach while general jurisdiction will be limited and eventually disappear).
26. W.F. BAILEY, THE LAW OF JURISDICTION, INCLUDING IMPEACHMENT OF
JUDGMENTS, LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL ACTS, AND SPECIAL REMEDIES (1st ed. 1899);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91-92 (1917) (reasoning by Justice Holmes where he
famously noted that "[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power ... the ground for
giving subsequent effect to a judgment is that the court rendering it had acquired power
to carry it out . . . ."); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
("[h]istorically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on
their de facto power of the defendant's person").
27. See, e.g., Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497
(1844); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839). See also 4 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1066 (4th ed.
2016).
28. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27. The Supreme Court confirmed this in
Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1878), where it held that consistent with due process,
a court could only assert jurisdiction over a non-consenting defendant who was either
physically residing or domiciled within the state or a non-citizen served while in the state.
29. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27 ("[A] corporation can have no legal
existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in
contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and
is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place
of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."); RICHARD D. FREER &
WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 32 (5th
ed. 2008).
30. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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incorporation.3 1 Thus, until about the middle of the 1800s, unless the
corporation owned property in the state and attachment was available,3 2
victims were out of luck if they wanted to bring a case in the state where
they lived and where the injury occurred. Although a corporation was
permitted to institute an action outside its state of incorporation, a
plaintiff could only sue a corporation in the state where it was
incorporated.33
During the 18th and most of the 19th centuries, this lack of a court's
ability to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was not a
looming issue because corporations typically operated only within the
boundaries of the state that created them.34 As corporations began doing
business across state lines, especially after the industrial revolution,
courts struggled with how to properly assert personal jurisdiction over
corporations incorporated in other states.
3 5 Limiting suits against them to
only one state-where they were incorporated-seemed both unrealistic
and unfair, resulting in a need to revise jurisdictional rules to match the
36
way corporations were increasingly operating.
Courts initially flirted with the idea of asserting personal
jurisdiction based on a corporation's consent either when a state
explicitly required consent or where it was implied.
37  This appears to
have been the case, especially where the cause of action arose from
business transactions within the state
38-a precursor to specific personal
31. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27 (citing McQueen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16





36. See id. (citing Charles E. Clark, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, in Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963) ("In the late. nineteenth century, and
continuing on into our own, increased use of the corporate form, together with the greater
mobility afforded by modem means of transportation, brought about an expansion of
corporate activity to a nationwide scale; corporations simply refused to remain penned up
within their own states of incorporation. The existence of corporations which could-
and did--do business on a nationwide scale necessitated revision of older, more limited,
notions concerning jurisdiction.")).
37. Id.; see also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407 (1855) (noting that a
corporation could only transact business in another state upon consent, and that consent
could be accompanied by such conditions as the state saw fit to impose. The court
further noted that "[i]t cannot be deemed unreasonable that the State of Ohio should
endeavor to secure to its citizens a remedy, in their domestic forum, upon this important
class of contracts made and to be performed within that State, and fully subject to its
laws; nor that proper means should be used to compel foreign corporations, transacting
this business of insurance within the State, for their benefit and profit, to answer there for
the breach of their contracts of insurance there made and to be performed."); St. Clair v.
Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
38. See St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356. In St. Clair, Justice Field noted:
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jurisdiction. Justice Field also alluded to the theory in the famous 1878
case of Pennoyer v. Neff3 9 where he noted that one option to overcome
jurisdictional barriers was simply to require a corporation to appoint an
agent for service of process as a condition for doing business within the
state as a type of "consent."4 0
Nonetheless, courts differed on whether the consent theory was fair
to corporations and whether consent was genuine, especially where the
cause of action did not arise from the corporations' actions with the state
asserting jurisdiction.41 Thus, in the 1800s and early 1900s, it never was
universally adopted as a theory of general personal jurisdiction.42
The consent theory continued to remain a questionable theory of
jurisdiction. Requiring "consent," of course, was based on the
assumption that states could prevent a foreign corporation from operating
within its territory. Indeed, by the time of Pennoyer, the Supreme Court
had already held that although states could not exclude natural persons
domiciled in other states from their territory under the Privilege and
Immunities Clause,43 the Clause did not protect corporations from such
exclusion.44 However, in 1910, the Supreme Court recognized that while
the Privilege and Immunities Clause might not prevent a state from
excluding a foreign corporation from operating within it-in that case,
for failure to file a financial statement-or prevent a corporation from
filing suit in the state, the Commerce Clause did.45  Yet, despite this
The State may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which a foreign
corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall
stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the State, it will
accept as sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specially
designated; and the condition would be eminently fit and just. And such
condition and stipulation may be implied as well as expressed.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Lafayette, 59 U.S. at 407.
39. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). This case is best known for its general
holding that a state court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has
not been personally served while within the state and whose property within the state was
not attached before the onset of litigation. See id at 735-36.
40. Id. at 735.
41. Id.; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27, at § 1066.
42. See discussion infra at Part V regarding more recent cases involving consent.
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
44. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177 (1869) (holding that corporations were not
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
45. See Int'l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 108-09 (1910) (finding that a state
could not preclude a foreign corporation from operating within it if it failed to provide a
financial statement, nor prevent it from bringing a case in state court if it failed to
register; such was only within the powers of Congress) (citing Crutcher v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 56-57 (1891) (finding that a state could not
require a foreign company to pay a license fee and file a financial statement as a means of
engaging in interstate commerce, as such was a violation of the Commerce Clause)). For
some reason, few of the more recent cases discussing consent to jurisdiction mention this
case.
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ruling, some courts continued to allow states to assert jurisdiction via
consent through the appointment of an agent for service in the state
where it did business, especially (but not always) where the cause of
action arose from the contacts.46 As discussed in more detail in Part VI,
the Supreme Court has never decided the question directly. It is also
questionable whether the state-based consent theory survived
International Shoe, where the Court focused on the number of contacts a
business had with a state,47 and whether it survived Daimler and
Goodyear, discussed infra Part VI.
In any event, perhaps due to other criticisms of the "consent"
theory, such that consent through appointment and service was not
genuine consent, courts, including the Supreme Court, soon returned (if
they had departed at all) to the notion of "presence" to assert general
personal jurisdiction over corporations.4 8 - The Supreme Court
determined "presence" by the level of economic activity a business
engaged in, and began using the term "doing business."4 9 The Supreme
46. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27, at § 1066; see also Philip Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
47. See Cognitronics Imaging Sys. v. Recognition Research Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 689
(E.D. Va. 2000). In Cognitronics, the court stated:
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the [Pennsylvania Fire] principle in
1939, the Court's decision in [International Shoe], cast doubt on the continued
viability of these cases. After International Shoe, the focus shifted from
whether the defendant had been served within the state to whether the
defendant's contacts with the state justified the state's assertion of'jurisdiction.
Id. at 692. See also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and
Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REv.
1, 36-37 (1986). -
48. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27, at § 1066; Int'l Harvester v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579, 588 (1914) ("We are satisfied that the presence of a corporation within a state
necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears that the corporation is there
carrying on business in such sense as to manifest its presence within the state."); People's
Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 84 (1918) (equating "found" as being
"present"); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530, 532 (1907) (finding that
jurisdiction "depends upon whether the corporation was doing business in that district in
such a manner and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that, through its agents, it
was present here"); St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 227 (1913)
("[T]he business must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the
corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is
served, and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with
process.").
49. See Int'l Harvester, 234 U.S. at 582-86 (using the term "doing business"
throughout to determine level of presence); see also People's Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. at
84 (noting that presence is determined by the level of business a defendant's agents
engaged in); Green, 205 U.S. at 532-34 (using the term "doing business" throughout to
determine level of presence); FREER & PERDUE, supra note 29, at 33.
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Court refrained from articulating a specific test as to how much business
was enough for general personal jurisdiction and said courts should
determine general personal jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis.o The
Court itself did just that in the early 1900s.s"
As time progressed, lower courts began to focus specifically on
what constituted "doing business,"52 but increasingly failed to equate the
level of "doing business" with the notion of "presence." Courts would
find there was general personal jurisdiction whenever a business was
"doing business" within the jurisdiction, even when the level of business
was fairly minimal.5 4 This more expansive notion of "doing business,"
which was not equated with "presence" itself, proved difficult for courts
to apply, and was particularly problematic for the Supreme Court.
B. International Shoe
In the 1945 case of International Shoe. Co. v. Washington, -the
Supreme Court reigned in the expansive, "doing business"-based general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. In so doing, the Court set forth
the test lower courts would rely on in determining personal jurisdiction
for the next 65-plus years: that assertions of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident corporate defendant satisfy due process56 where the business
has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."57
The issue in International Shoe was whether the State of
Washington could assert personal jurisdiction over the Delaware
corporation, which had its principal place of business in Missouri, for
3
50. See Int'l Harvester, 234 U.S. at 583; see also People's Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. at
86-87.
51. See, e.g., Int'l Harvester, 234 U.S. at 583-84 (holding the company engaged in
continuous solicitation of orders through local agents in Kentucky, shipped equipment to
these agents, and the agents continuously accepted payments for the equipment, thus
doing sufficient business to provide for general jurisdiction); see also People's Tobacco
Co., 246 U.S. at 84-85, and Green, 205 U.S. at 533 (holding in both that based on a case-
by case analysis, the level of a foreign corporation's business activity was not enough to
for a court to assert personal jurisdiction).
52. See Kurland, supra note 46, at 584-86; see also FREER & PERDUE, supra note
29, at 36.
53. Kurland, supra note 46, at 584-85.
54. Id.
55. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56. Id. at 320. As early as 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to corporations. See Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394,
396 (1886).
57. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)
(holding that individuals can be sued in the state of their domicile for all claims, as such
satisfies due process, i.e., "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice")).
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failing to pay into the state unemployment compensation fund given that
it had several salesmen living and operating in Washington State.
58 The
Supreme Court held that the lower court could assert jurisdiction over the
business, given that its salesmen operated "systematically and
continuously" in the state by soliciting orders, and that a large volume of
merchandise was regularly shipped into the state as a result of those
orders.59 The Court did not directly hold that the claims sued upon had
to arise out of the contacts for there to be personal jurisdiction. The
Court did note, however, perhaps as an aside, that the obligation "which
is here sued upon arose out of those very activities,"
60-what we now
refer to as specific jurisdiction. It is this comment that led Justice
Ginsberg to determine in Goodyear and Daimler that the "systematic
and continuous" language relates to specific jurisdiction, not general
personal jurisdiction.6 1
Although the Court did not directly specify the level of contacts
sufficient for specific jurisdiction versus general jurisdiction other than
to indicate that the contacts must be more substantial for assertions of
general personal jurisdiction than for specific jurisdiction, it did state that
"there have been instances in which the continuous and corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities."
62 Thus, the Court
recognized that contacts may be sufficiently continuous and substantial
to assert general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
C. General Personal Jurisdiction Over Transnational Corporations
Post-International Shoe
After International Shoe, U.S. courts often relied on the case to
assert general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations, finding
that the corporations had engaged in sufficiently systematic and
continuous business to justify courts' assertions of general personal
jurisdiction.6 3 They did so with little controversy or intervention by
58. Id. at 311-13.
59. Id. at 319-20.
60. Id. at 320; see also id. at 314.
61. See infra at Section III.A.
62. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added) (citing Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v.
Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y.
1917); St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913)).
63. See, e.g., Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 96
(D.D.C. 2003) (holding that two of the defendant corporations were subject to general
personal jurisdiction given the level of contacts within the United States as a whole, for
purposes of allowing jurisdictional discovery against bank); Gorman v. Ameritrade
Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that a broker conducting
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Congress. The Supreme Court only addressed general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation twice between International Shoe
and Goodyear, each time applying the test it set forth in International
Shoe. Regarding the facts of each case relevant for the general personal
jurisdiction test, they were on quite different ends of the scale.
The first case was the 1952 case of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.6 4 In that case, which involved the rights of a stockholder, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the lower court could assert general
personal jurisdiction over a Philippines-based mining company in Ohio,
where the corporate defendant had temporarily located its headquarters
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in the wake of World
War II, thus engaging in continuous and systematic business there.65 The
second case was the 1984 case of Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.A. v. Hall, 6 a case involving a helicopter crash in Peru, with the
owners of the helicopter, Helicopteros, a Columbian corporation being
sued in Texas. Although the Court affirmed that general personal
jurisdiction could exist where there is "continuous and systematic"
business activity,6 1 it rejected the argument that general personal
jurisdiction could be asserted in Texas based on the facts of the case.
The Court declined to assert personal jurisdiction over Helicopteros,
noting that the corporation did not have a place of business in Texas, and
that the contacts were based upon (1) a one-time visit by the CEO to
business entirely online, targeting DC residents and local businesses and receiving
revenue from those transactions, met the continuous and systematic contacts required for
general personal jurisdiction, but dismissing the case due to improper service of process);
Bankhead Enter., Inc. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 642 F.2d 802, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding general personal jurisdiction where defendant leased an office and employed
sales agents and clerical staff); Hayes v. Evergo Tel. Co., 397 S.E.2d 325, 329 (N.C.
App. 1990) (finding general personal jurisdiction over a Hong Kong Corporation proper
where it sold $35 million of products throughout United States); Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550
A.2d 1105, 1127 (Del. 1988) (holding that consistent with International Shoe, asserting
general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation operating a wholly-owned
subsidiary in Delaware for thirty years was proper); Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 382
N.E.2d 252, 257 (Ill. 1978) (finding general personal jurisdiction based on systematic and
continuous contacts where defendant sold products in Illinois through independent dealer
and sponsored sales promotions in Illinois, and required dealer to perform warrant work
on all of manufacturer's products and to make records and facilities available for
inspection); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441 (N.Y. 1965) (finding
general personal jurisdiction over foreign airline which maintained a one-and-a-half room
office and employed several people in the state). Many courts continued to use the term
"systematic and continuous business," even though International Shoe used the term "so
substantial and of such a nature to justify" general personal jurisdiction. Int'l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 318.
64. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
65. Id. at 438, 449.
66. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
67. Id. at 416.
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Texas for a negotiation session, (2) that it had accepted checks drawn
upon a Texas bank,(3) that it had purchased helicopters, equipment, and
training services from a Texas-based company, and (4) that it had sent
personnel to Texas for training on the equipment.6 8 For the Court, these
facts were simply not enough to permit the assertion of general personal
jurisdiction.
The Court's analysis in Helicopteros gives some guidance as to how
much business activity the Court believed was sufficient for lower courts
to assert general personal jurisdiction before Goodyear and Daimler. A
one-time visit to the state, banking, and purchases and training were not
sufficiently continuous and systematic to equate to "presence" under
International Shoe. In distinguishing Perkins from Helicopteros, the
Court noted that in Perkins, the corporation had carried on a "continuous
and systematic," albeit limited, part of its general business"70 in Ohio
when the president and general manager temporarily maintained an
office there and conducted activities on behalf of the corporation, such as
holding directors' meetings, sending out correspondence, keeping the
company files, distributing salary checks drawn on two Ohio banks, and
supervising policies related to the corporation's properties in the
Philippines.7 1 Perkins is an easy case, so easy that sixty-one years later,
in Daimler, the Court noted that the circumstances in Perkins were the
type that might allow a court to assert general personal jurisdiction over
corporations in "exceptional circumstances."72 Given the rarity of the
Supreme Court speaking on the issue of general personal jurisdiction
after International Shoe and before Goodyear, and the very divergent
facts in Perkins and Helicopteros, it remains unclear whether the
Supreme Court would have always required such overwhelming facts of
presence to assert general business jurisdiction, or if lesser facts (but
better than in Helicopteros) would have been sufficient. We will never
know. What we do know, however, is that International Shoe and its
progeny allowed courts to assert general personal jurisdiction over TNCs
engaged in sufficiently systematic and continuous business in the United
States and which were accused of violating customary international
human rights laws when victims sought relief in U.S. courts, particularly
under the ATS.
68. Id. at 416, 426.
69. Id. at 418.
70. Id. at 421 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438).
71. Id. at 415 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445).
72. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014).
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II. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, AND COURTS'
ASSERTION OF GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS INVOLVED IN SUCH CLAIMS
A. The Modern Development of the A TS
In 1789, Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute73, which allows
noncitizens to bring claims in federal court for violations of "the law of
nations," which courts commonly equate with customary international
law.74 The statute was virtually ignored for nearly two centuries,7s until
the 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,6 involving torture claims
against a former Paraguayan military officer, gave it new life. Although
the defendant in Filartiga lived in New York at the time, the statute does
not limit who can be defendants,77 and does not exclude claims arising
from extraterritorial conduct. * Importantly, the Second Circuit rejected
the argument that U.S. courts could not assert subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the case79 because it involved extraterritorial conduct by a foreign
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS
reads, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
74. The "law of nations" is generally equated with customary international law. See,
e.g., The Estrella, 17 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1819) (referring to non-treaty-based law of
nations as the "the customary . . . law of nations"); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414
F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) ("In the context of the ATCA [ATS], we have
consistently used the term 'customary international law' as a synonym for the term the
'law of nations."').
75. Many scholars have traced the history of the ATS. See, e.g., William R. Casto,
The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 635, 664-68 (2006); William Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary
International Law in the U.S. Legal System after Sosa, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87,
92-95 (2004); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 464-70 (1997);
Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims. Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 11-31 (1985); Beth Stephens, The
Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66
FoRDHAM L. REv. 393, 402-13 (1997).
76 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
77. However, in order to hear a claim, a court must still have personal jurisdiction
over any defendant. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 608-10 (1990).
78. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, limited the extraterritorial scope of the ATS
in the 2013 Kiobel decision. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668-69
(2013). But Congress has never limited the ATS to conduct within the United States.
See id. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that "Congress, while aware of the award
of civil damages under the ATS-including cases such as Filartiga with foreign
plaintiffs, defendants, and conduct-has not sought to limit the statute's jurisdictional or
substantive reach.")
79. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
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official, noting that the alleged violation-torture-was of interest to all
of mankind, especially given developments in human rights after World
War II, squarely fitting within the ATS enacted by the First Congress.80
Although initially after Filartiga ATS claims were brought
primarily against individuals," soon plaintiffs began bringing ATS cases
against corporations-domestic and foreign-most typically for aiding
and abetting human rights violations abroad.82 Between 1980 and
Goodyear in 2011, approximately 312 ATS cases were brought against
businesses or organizations. Although the ATS has been criticized,84
the statute has been an important source of relief for non-citizens seeking
remedies for harms caused by TNCs' violations of international human
81rights law norms.
In the 2004 case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,86 the U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed that federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims for violations of customary international law under the
ATS, and it did not limit the claims to violations occurring in the United
States.87 Specifically, the Court found that the ATS was a jurisdictional
statute, but that federal courts can use their common law powers to
recognize claims for violations of international law norms, as long as the
norms are as specifically defined and universally recognized as those
violations Congress would have had in mind when it enacted the
statute-piracy, attacks on diplomats, and attacks on safe passage.88 The
80. Id. at 890.
81. Most individual defendants have been former officials of foreign governments
that engaged in human rights abuses. See Richard M. Buxbaum & David D. Caron, The
Alien Tort Statute: An Overview of the Current Issues, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 511, 513
n.5 (2010).
82. Id; see also John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Lecture at
Vanderbilt Law School, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien
Tort Statute and Other Approaches (April 11, 2008); Skinner, Beyond Kiobel, supra note
11, at 160.
83. The calculation of the number of cases comes from reviewing the dataset
attached to Cortelyou C. Kenney's article, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84
FORDHAM L. REv. 1053 (2015). The table of cases she compiled and relies upon can be
found at http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/Documents/KenneyDecember -Dataset.xlsx
(last visited June 16, 2016) [hereinafter Kenney Dataset]. This number of 312 cases is
not to be confused with the 325 non-frivolous cases she explains were resolved between
1980 and 2015 that she references in her article, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. at 1067.
84. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The United States Can't Be the World's Courthouse,
SLATE (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news.and politics/view from_
chicago/2013/04/thesupreme court andthealientort statute ending human rights_s
uits.html.
85. Skinner, BeyondKiobel, supra note 11, at 161 n.12.
86. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
87. Id. at 693-95.
88. Id. at 724-25. The Court cautioned lower federal courts, however, to evaluate
the claims brought in each case with a prudential eye toward whether the recognition of
such a claim in a particular case might cause foreign policy complications. Id. at 727-28.
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Court also cited positively several ATS cases where the harm giving rise
to the claim took place abroad, including Filartiga.8 9
In the April 2013 case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the U.S.
Supreme Court limited the extraterritorial application of the ATS, but
certainly did not preclude such claims. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court
found that the presumption against extraterritoriality90 applies to ATS
claims brought for violations of customary international law that occur
abroad.91 The Court held that plaintiffs can overcome the presumption
by showing that a claim "touch[es] and concern[s]" the territory of the
United States with sufficient force; however, a business' presence in the
United States is not alone sufficient to overcome the presumption.92 In
Kiobel, a plurality opinion, four of the Justices suggested in their
concurring opinion that serious violations of human rights, could "touch
and concern" the United States with sufficient force to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality.9 ' These Justices would find the
presumption against extraterritoriality overcome under the ATS if "(1)
the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an
American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming
a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind."94 Justice Kennedy left open the
possibility that serious violations of international law could meet the
"touch and concern" requirement.95  Thus, it is important to note a
majority of Justices may find that serious violations of international law
"touch and concern" the United States with sufficient force to overcome
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
In fact, in several ATS cases since Kiobel, lower federal courts have
found the presumption overcome, finding that complaints sufficiently
In perhaps what was an inkling of what was to trouble the Court in Kiobel, the Court also
indicated in a footnote the possibility of requiring exhaustion of claims in the country
where the harm occurred. Id. at 733 n.21.
89. Id. at 725.
90 The presumption against extraterritoriality is the "longstanding principle of
American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949)). In applying this principle, courts "assume that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality." EEOC, 499 U.S. at
248.
91. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
92 Id.
93. Id. at 1673-75 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 1671.
95. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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allege that funding or decision-making leading to the human rights
violations took place in the United States.96 Thus, even though Kiobel
has limited claims that can be brought pursuant to the ATS, claims will
continue to be brought, making the limits on general personal jurisdiction
discussed herein a critical problem for victims seeking relief under the
ATS.
B. Before Goodyear and Daimler, Courts Often Asserted General
Personal Jurisdiction Over TNCs in A TS Cases.
Although it was never easy to assert jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation with few ties to the United States (and in fact, plaintiffs
rarely attempted to do so), courts in ATS cases almost always asserted
general personal jurisdiction over transnational corporations accused of
human rights violations.97 In fact, before Goodyear and Daimler, foreign
corporations (whether the corporation was incorporated in a different
state or abroad) rarely challenged a court's assertion of general personal
jurisdiction, as long as the corporation was conducting continuous and
systematic business in the state where the claim was brought, including
96. Several cases have been found to survive the Kiobel "touch and concern"
standard. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir.
2014), Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. CV 01-1357, 2015 WL 5042118 (D.D.C. July 6,
2015); Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that there is
subject matter jurisdiction over the case under the ATS, but certifying this issue for
appeal because the jurisdiction is one of first impression); Sexual Minorities Uganda v.
Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that allegations were
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under ATS since both crimes against humanity and
aiding and abetting liability are well-established and accepted customary international
law); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395, 2014 WL 1669873 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,
2014) (finding that the court had jurisdiction because plaintiffs were suing the
Rajaratnam defendants, who are U.S. citizens, for their alleged actions that occurred
within the US territory); Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717, 728 (D. Md.
2014) (finding that ATS claims could be brought against a defendant that has taken
certain actions within the United States with respect to products that might be primarily
used for violations of the laws of nations); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-CV-00342, 2013
WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (concluding that defendant has waived his rights
based on the Kiobel decision and as a permanent U.S. resident, he should be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court ); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1131-33 (2016); You v.
Japan, No. 15-03257 WHA, 2015 WL 6689398 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015), dismissed on
other grounds; Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-00054-SLG, 2015
WL 3745641 (D. Alaska June 12, 2015).
97. For example, of the approximately 312 human rights cases filed against
businesses or organizations between 1980, when modern ATS litigation began, and
Goodyear, only nine cases were dismissed on personal jurisdiction grounds. See Kenney,
supra note 83, at 1067-69, generally, and the Kenney Dataset, supra note 83]. Although
this information does not reveal which defendants were foreign corporations, it does give
a sense that few were dismissed on the basis of personal jurisdiction. See infra at this
section for further discussion of cases and the reasons for their dismissal.
6372017]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
when it was operating through a subsidiary located there.9 8 In addition,
before Daimler, courts in ATS cases also asserted general jurisdiction
over a parent TNC when such parents had U.S. subsidiaries, finding that
the subsidiary was acting as an agent for the parent for purposes of
personal jurisdiction.99 Other times, courts asserted general personal
jurisdiction over a corporation for alleged human rights abuses by noting
that a U.S.-based subsidiary was acting as a foreign parent's alter ego,
and that jurisdiction over the parent should exist under a theory similar to
98. See, e.g., Complaint for War Crimes; Aiding and Abetting Extrajudicial Killing;
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Wrongful Death; and
Negligence at 12, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(No. 05-cv-05192-CMP-FOB), 2005 WL 976855 (noting that Caterpillar "does sufficient
business in Washington to be considered a resident of Washington." Even though it is
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Illinois, the defendant did
not raise lack of personal jurisdiction in any motion to dismiss.); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671
F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that Rio- Tinto, an international mining group.
incorporated and based in England and Australia, conceded that he federal district court
in California had general personal jurisdiction over it, given that it had substantial
operations in the United States, with 47 percent of its consolidated operating assets
located in North America in 1999); Doe v. Exxon, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.C.C. 2005)
(noting that the corporate parent, Exxon Mobile Corp., did not challenge personal
jurisdiction of the District of Columbia court, even though Exxon Mobile is a New Jersey
corporation with its headquarters in Irving, Texas.). See also Manook v. Research
Triangle Inst., 693 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that the defendant Unity, a
foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore with its principal base of
business in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, had systematic and continuous contacts in the
District of Columbia, but allowing for discovery to see whether such contacts were
substantial enough). During discovery, the case settled. E-mail from Susan Burke,
Plaintiffs' Counsel, Law Offices of Susan L. Burke, to author (July 13, 2016, 6:29 AM)
(confirming case was settled) (on file with author).
99. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a
New York subsidiary investor elations office was an "agent" of the parent companies for
purposes of jurisdiction because all of the subsidiary's time was devoted to the
companies' business, the companies fully funded the subsidiary's expenses, and the
subsidiary sought the companies' approval on important decisions). This decision was
important, as the case ultimately settled. See Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to
Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html?ref global&_r-0; see also Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882(DLC), 2004
WL 1920978, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004) (finding that the court could assert
general personal jurisdiction over Talisman given its subsidiary's presence in New York
because the subsidiary was a "mere department" of the parent corporation); Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920-23 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd, 134 S. Ct.
746 (2014) (holding that a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
["MBUSA"], which served as the U.S. general distributor of automobiles of the German
parent manufacturer DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (DCAG), was DCAG's agent
for general jurisdictional purposes). At other times, courts have found either actual
consent through the naming of a registered agent, or implied consent through the
corporations' engaging in business in the state, although both theories have increasingly
been rejected. See discussion infra at Part VI.
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piercing the corporate veil for liability purposes.'00 These assertions of
general personal jurisdiction allowed victims of human rights abuses to
seek a remedy in U.S. courts under the ATS, a rare opportunity in a
world with few options for remedy for such victims.
The next Part describes how Goodyear and Daimler have and will
continue to severely impact victims' ability to seek remedies against
TNCs that do significant business in the United States under the ATS for
their roles in human rights violations (as well as other human rights-
related causes of action, such as the ATA and Trafficking Victim's
Protection Act).
III. THE SEA CHANGE-GOODYEAR TO DAIMLER
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,'ot and
Daimler AG v. Bauman,02 the Court created a sea change in the law of
general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants, thus
impacting human rights victims' ability to seek remedy for human rights
violations under the ATS and other human-rights related causes of
action. In the decisions, the Court held that even where foreign
corporations conduct systematic and continuous business in the United
States, U.S. courts cannot assert general personal jurisdiction over them
consistent with the Due Process Clause unless the corporations' activities
are "so continuous and systematic" as to render them essentially "at
home" in the forum state.103 Under Daimler, in nearly all circumstances,
this will mean the corporation must be headquartered or incorporated in
the forum state.104
With regard to asserting general personal jurisdiction over an out-
of-state corporation due to its subsidiary's (or parent's) presence in the
state, the Goodyear Court suggested such might be possible if the
plaintiffs could essentially "pierce the corporate veil" for purposes of
jurisdiction, a test similar to that of piercing the veil for liability
purposes, but opined that it would not consider the question because the
100. Exxon, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled that
the Indonesian subsidiary, EMOI, acted as the alter ego of the parent corporation); see
also Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 47, at 14 (finding that to merge a parent and
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry similar to that of piercing the
corporate veil). Although based on different legal theories, many jurisdictions have
applied the "piercing the corporate veil" test as the test for agency for jurisdictional
purposes; other courts have complied a less onerous test, focusing more on the specific
acts of the subsidiary. See id.
101. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
102. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
103. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918-19; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
104. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
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plaintiffs did not explicitly argue it. 05 In Daimler, the Supreme Court
noted that the Ninth Circuit's test for jurisdiction due to agency was less
rigorous than several other jurisdictions, pointing to those jurisdictions
that require piercing of the corporate veil for general jurisdictional
purposes.io0 But like in Goodyear, the Court passed on deciding
whether, and under what circumstances, courts can assert general
personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on agency or alter
ego theories.0 7  As discussed in more detail below, the Court did,
however, reject what the Court viewed as the Ninth Circuit's finding of
jurisdiction over a parent simply where the subsidiary's role was
important to the business of the enterprise, finding such a theory too
sweeping. It is more likely that the current Court, if it accepts any
agency or alter ego theory of jurisdiction in the future, will accept only a
theory of jurisdiction based on alter ego, or veil piercing of the type
associating with "piercing the corporate veil" for liability purposes,109 a
very difficult test to satisfy, indeed."0
A. Goodyear v. Brown
The 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
v. Brown was the first significant change in Supreme Court law
concerning U.S. courts' assertion of general personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations since International Shoe, with the decision
significantly limiting courts' ability to assert general personal jurisdiction
over TNCs. In Goodyear, families of two North Carolina children who
had been killed in a French bus accident caused by defective tires sued
Goodyear USA, a U.S. tire manufacturer, and three foreign subsidiaries
located in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France."' Goodyear USA did not
contest general personal jurisdiction because it had plants in North
Carolina and regularly conducted business there' 2-notably, no longer
sufficient contacts for a court to assert jurisdiction after Goodyear. The
foreign subsidiaries, however, did contest jurisdiction."3 None of them
105. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930-31.
106. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 759-60.
109. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930 ("In effect, respondents would have us pierce
Goodyear corporate veils, at least for jurisdictional purposes.") (citing Brilmayer &
Paisley, supra note 47, at 14, 29-30 (merging parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional
purposes requires an inquiry "comparable to the corporate law question of piercing the
corporate veil").
110. Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability, supra note 11, at 1798.
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had direct connections to North Carolina; none were registered to do
business in North Carolina; none designed, manufactured, or advertised
their products in North Carolina; none solicited business in North
Carolina; and none sold or shipped tires to North Carolina.'14 The North
Carolina court simply relied on the fact that that the subsidiaries had
placed their tires in the stream of commerce without any limitation on
those tires being sold in North Carolina"' 5-a fact that the Court
correctly noted went to specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction." 6
The North Carolina court also noted that the North Carolina plaintiffs
would experience hardship if they were required to litigate their claims in
France, where the injuries occurred, given that they had no ties to that
country. "7
The argument for general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries
was not particularly compelling given the lack of connection between
them and North Carolina, where the case was brought. General personal
jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries likely would not have been
sufficient even before Goodyear, given the tests outlined in International
Shoe and Helicopteros. However, the analysis reshaped general personal
jurisdiction over TNCs in a significant way-by limiting general
personal jurisdiction to a place where the foreign corporation was
"essentially at home" in the jurisdiction." 8
The Goodyear Court directly relied on International Shoe in finding
that contacts had to essentially render the corporation "at home" in the
jurisdiction.' 9  Of course, International Shoe does not state that a
company's contacts must be so continuous and systematic to essentially
render the corporation "at home" in order for a court to assert general
personal jurisdiction over it; indeed International Shoe does not even use
the language "essentially at home." Thus, the Court arguably
mischaracterizes International Shoe by using the signal "See" when
referencing the case, a signal which suggests that International Shoe
directly supports the statement that a business' contacts must be so
114. Id. at921.
115. Id. at 919 (citing Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 388-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009),
rev'dsub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)).
116. Id (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 922-27.
117. Id at 922.
118. Id. at 919, 929. In the case, the Court distinguished between specific jurisdiction
and general jurisdiction. The Court applied the constitutional due process requirement of
systematic and continuous activity for asserting personal jurisdiction even where the
claim arose from the contacts-i.e., specific jurisdiction. Id. at 923. For the specific
jurisdiction, the Court noted that jurisdiction can unquestionably be asserted where the
corporation's intra-state activity is continuous and systematic "and that activity [gives]
rise to the episode-in-suit." Id. (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317
(1945)).
119. Id at 919.
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continuous as to render the business "at home" in the state.120 Rather,
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the majority, uses the verbiage after noting
that the paradigm forum for exercising personal jurisdiction over a
corporation should equate to an individual's "domicile."1 2 1
International Shoe is in fact ambiguous with regard to how
"systematic and continuous" the contacts must be to give rise to general
personal jurisdiction.122 Of course, it is clear that the contacts must be
more systematic and continuous to justify general personal jurisdiction
than specific jurisdiction when the suit does not arise from the contacts-
but the case states only that the contacts must be "so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities."l23 International Shoe
does not hold that such places can only be where the corporation is
essentially at home, or even limit it to the place of incorporation or
principle place of business, even though the Court certainly could have.
Moreover, the two cases Justice Ginsburg discusses, Perkins and
Helicopteros, are at the two ends of a continuum of what contacts might
be sufficient for general personal jurisdiction. In Goodyear, the Court
had some latitude in reaching a decision on the facts of the case
concerning whether the business activity of the subsidiaries was enough
to allow a court to assert jurisdiction over them consistent with due
process. It could easily have reached a decision finding a lack of general
personal jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries based on current case
law and in line with lower court decisions. Rather, given its analysis, the
Court basically found that lower courts in the United States have been
violating foreign corporations' due process rights for decades.
B. The Nicastro Decision and Specific Personal Jurisdiction
In a sister opinion issued on the same day as Goodyear, J. McIntyre
Machinery, Limited v. Nicastro,124 the Supreme Court also dramatically
narrowed specific personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The
case involved a worker who injured his hand in New Jersey while using a
metal-shearing machine that Defendant, R J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
(J. McIntyre), manufactured in England, where the company is
incorporated and operates.125 Mr. Nicastro filed his products-liability
suit in a state court in New Jersey, and J. McIntyre sought to dismiss the
120. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 58 (Columbia
Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015).
121. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
122. Int'1Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
123. Id. at 318.
124. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
125. Id. at 878.
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suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.12 6  Only one of J. McIntyre's
machines ended up in New Jersey, and it did not appear the company
conducted any advertising, marketing, or shipping of its products to New
Jersey.127 In its decision finding New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction,
the Court held that for a court to assert specific personal jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation, the corporation must have purposefully directed its
product to the specific U.S. state where the court sits. 12 8  The Court
reasoned that by specifically directing its products to a specific state, the
foreign corporation is intending to benefit from the protection of the
particular state's laws.12 9 The Court found that such was not the case
with J. McIntyre; it did not specifically direct its products to New
Jersey.13 0  To hold otherwise, the Court found, would violate due
process.
13 1
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the majority opinion in
Goodyear, wrote a livid dissent, wherein she argued that a court should
be able to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
in the state where the harm occurred if the corporation markets its
product to the United States as a whole rather than to a specific state. 132
Notably, however, she did not consider whether the defendant's contacts
with the state or the nation as a whole were systematic, substantial, and
continuous, even though in dicta in Goodyear, she suggested such an
analysis should occur for specific jurisdiction, citing International
Shoe.133
Just as with Goodyear, Nicastro will further limit courts' assertions
of jurisdiction over TNCs for torts they commit.134 This decision is part
of the general narrowing of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in a
manner that makes it difficult for natural persons-whether foreign or
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 886.
129. Id. at 887.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id. at 905-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow the assertion of jurisdiction for a federal claim involving a transnational
corporation where there is cumulatively significant activity in the United States, as long
as there is not sufficiently "significant" activity in one single state to support personal
jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
133. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
134. See, e.g., Kate Bonacorsi, Note, Not at Home with "At-Home" Jurisdiction, 37
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1821, 1853-54 (2014) (noting Nicastro's limitation of asserting
personal jurisdiction over transnational corporations); ScoTT L. NELSON & ALLISON M.
ZIEVE, PUBLIC CITIZEN, INJURY IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
AFTER 1 MCINTYRE V. NICASTRO 11-22 (2014) (arguing that plaintiffs injured by
corporations abroad have lost many rights to sue due to Nicastro, and arguing that
corporations can structure themselves in order to evade litigation in the U.S.).
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U.S. citizens-to seek a remedy in U.S. courts when a cause of action for
a tort exists against TNCs, which is troubling enough. But it also has
implications for assertions of personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations involved in human rights violations abroad. Nicastro is
important to this analysis because it is unclear how courts will apply
Nicastro to those human rights cases that survive Kiobel under the theory
that the case "touches and concerns" the United States where decisions
leading to harm were made in the United States, or money sent from the
United States resulted in the harm.135 In fact, before Nicastro, alleging
that decisions leading to harm took place in the United States, or money
was sent from the United States, could have supplied courts with specific
personal jurisdiction over the TNC, but that may no longer be possible
after Nicastro.
C. Daimler v. Bauman
In Daimler AG v. Bauman,136 the U.S. Supreme Court further
limited U.S. courts' (federal and state) assertions of general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. In Daimler, the Supreme Court
affirmed Goodyear's holding1 3 7 that general personal jurisdiction can
only be asserted over a foreign corporation where the corporation is
essentially "at home," but essentially limited "home" to either the place
of incorporation or principal place of business." Perhaps even more
importantly to human rights litigation, the Court severely restricted the
use of the "agency" theory to establish jurisdiction over a foreign parent
with a U.S. subsidiaryl 39-a significant and serious impediment to
human rights litigation in the United States.
In Daimler, the plaintiffs were Argentinian residents who sued
Daimler AG (Daimler), a German corporation, in U.S. district court in
California for human rights violations by its Argentinian subsidiary
Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MB Argentina) in Argentina, where it
allegedly collaborated with state security forces that kidnapped, detained,
tortured, and killed certain workers of MB Argentina.140 The plaintiffs,
family members of the victims, alleged that Daimler was vicariously
liable for acts of its Argentinian subsidiary.14 1 Plaintiffs claimed the U.S.
District Court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit on two bases: first, due to
135. See discussion supra Part II.A.
136. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
137. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915, 929.
138. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
139. Id. at 760-63.
140. Id. at 750-51.
141. Id. at 751-52.
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the presence and contacts of Daimler itself in Califomia,1 42 and second,
on the theory that the U.S. subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MB
USA) acted as Daimler's agent in California, and thus, its contacts
should be imputed to Daimler for purposes of jurisdiction.143 MB USA
is not headquartered or incorporated in California; rather it is
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New
Jersey.144 However, Plaintiffs alleged that MB USA is Daimler's
exclusive importer and distributor of Mercedes-Benz in the United
States, and distributed those vehicles to independent dealerships
throughout the United States, including California. 145 The plaintiffs
alleged MB USA also has multiple California-based facilities, and, inter
alia, MB USA's California sales accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler's
worldwide sales.14 6
The federal district court found that Daimler's own contacts with
California were insufficient for the court to assert general personal
jurisdiction over Daimler, and that the plaintiffs failed to establish that
MB USA acted as Daimler's agent.147 The Ninth Circuit overturned the
district court's decision regarding agency, holding that the district court
could assert general personal jurisdiction over Daimler because MB USA
was an agent for jurisdictional purposes.148  Importantly, Daimler
conceded that the federal court had general personal jurisdiction over
MB USA (which it might not have done in light of Goodyear)149-and
thus, the Ninth Circuit found that asserting jurisdiction over Daimler via
MB USA's imputation of contacts was reasonable.150 The Ninth Circuit
explained that in California, there were two ways in which the contacts
of the subsidiary could be imputed to the parent-either through alter
ego or agency theories, finding the latter applicable in the case.s15 Before
the Supreme Court decision in Daimler, a California subsidiary's
contacts could be imputed to the foreign parent for purposes of asserting
general personal jurisdiction over the parent, as long as the subsidiary
was acting as an "agent" of the parent.152 For jurisdictional purposes, a





147. Id. at 752-53 (citing the district court decisions) (internal citations omitted).
148. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912-14 (9th Cir. 2011).
149. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758.
150. Id. at 753 (citing 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011)). The plaintiffs did not appeal the
district court's decision that Daimler's own contacts were not sufficient for the court to
assert personal jurisdiction on that basis. Id. at 758.
151. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 920.
152. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1134
(9th Cir. 2003).
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subsidiary corporation was considered an agent if "the subsidiary
represents the parent corporation by performing services sufficiently
important to the parent corporation that if it did not have a representative
to perform them, the parent corporation would undertake to perform
substantially similar services.""' The Ninth Circuit went into a lengthy
discussion of the General Distributor Agreement, focusing on both
Daimler's control over MB USA, as well as the fact that without the
subsidiary, the function of importing and distributing would have to be
done by Daimler itself.1 54  The Ninth Circuit also found that the
defendant did not meet the burden of establishing "unreasonableness" (a
second fact the court explored for purposes of due process) based on a
variety of factors, such as California's interest in adjudicating a human
rights case, the adequacy of Argentina as a forum, and Daimler's
pervasive contacts in California through its subsidiary, MB USA. 155
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, holding
that the lower courts could not assert general personal jurisdiction over
Daimler, the parent, consistent with due process.15 6  After affirming
Goodyear's holding that general personal jurisdiction can only be
asserted over a foreign corporation where the corporation is essentially
"at home,"'57 the Court opined that in determining a corporation's home,
a court must appraise a corporation's activities in their entirety, looking
both nationwide and worldwide. 158 The Court explained that a
corporation cannot be at home in several locations, otherwise the new
jurisdictional test would be no different than the prior "doing business"
test.159 The Supreme Court then essentially limited a foreign corporation
to having one home-either its place of incorporation or principal place
of business, except in an "exceptional case."1 6 0 The example the Court
gave of an "exceptional case" was the situation in Perkins, where the
company essentially relocated most of its operations temporarily to the
United States during World War 11.161 The Court did not explore what
other situations might be "exceptional," noting only that the defendant in
the case, a German corporation, had practically no connection to
153. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 920 (quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
154. Id at 921-24.
155. Id at 924-930. The seven factors the court weighed were: the extent of
purposeful interjection; the burden on the defendant; the extent of conflict with
sovereignty of the defendant's state; the forum state's interest in adjudicating the suit; the
most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; the convenience and effectiveness of
relief for the plaintiff; and the existence of an alternative forum.
156. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
157. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
158. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 761 n.19.
161. Id.
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California, and thus did not even come close to "approaching that
level."l62
The important issue of whether the contacts of MB USA could be
attributed to Daimler, the German parent, for purposes of general
jurisdiction was the Court's more complex, and confusing, analysis.
Although the Court technically passed on opining if the Ninth Circuit's
agency analysis for jurisdictional purposes was appropriate,
6 1 in this
author's view, the Supreme Court essentially rejected the argument that
the economic activities of a parent's wholly-owned subsidiary could be
attributed to the parent company under an agency theory for purposes of
general personal jurisdiction.164
In its analysis, the Court noted that the General Distributor
Agreement between MB USA and Daimler specifically stated that the
agreement did not make MB USA an agent of Daimler, and stated that
MB USA had no authority to make binding obligations for or act on
behalf of Daimler.16 5 The Court then went on to review whether there
still might be attribution of contacts nonetheless. Importantly, because
Daimler did not challenge the California court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over MB USA in the district court
1 6 6 (it likely would have
post-Goodyear), the Supreme Court assumed that the district court would
have general personal jurisdiction over MB USA in analyzing whether
the court could then assert personal jurisdiction over Daimler consistent
with due process. 167 However, it found that even if MB USA's contacts
could be imputed to Daimler, Daimler still could not be found to be at
home in California.'68  The Court opined that if it held otherwise,
Daimler could likely be sued in any jurisdiction, a sweeping
jurisdictional analysis not tenable under the Constitution's Due Process
Clause, and one that it rejected in Goodyear.'69 The alter ego theory,
where plaintiffs need to demonstrate a piercing of the corporate veil,
appears to remain the only option for attribution of contacts, but the
Court did not address that issue with any significance.
The purpose of this Article is not to provide an in-depth criticism or
analysis of Daimler, but a few points are worth mentioning. First, the
opinion's agency analysis appears circular and contradictory in that the
Court assumed MB USA was at home in California, and assumed its
162. Id.
163. Id. at 759.
164. Id at 761-62.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 758.
167. Id.
168. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
169. Id. at 760-62.
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contacts (which met the level of "at home") could be imputed to
Daimler, yet it still found that asserting general personal jurisdiction over
Daimler was unconstitutional. Justice Ginsburg gives a hint as to why
this could be in Footnote 20, stating that "[g]eneral jurisdiction instead
calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety,
nationwide and worldwide."17 0 In so stating, she is likely suggesting that
even if Daimler is "at home" in California due to MB USA, Daimler may
be more at home in other locations. Although she does not specifically
engage in a "reasonableness" discussion, she suggests it was simply
unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over Daimler, and therefore,
unconstitutional. In this way, Justice Ginsburg implemented a two-prong
test, the second being one of reasonableness, much like the Ninth Circuit
did in its decision.17 1
Second, what seemed to particularly trouble the Court was that the
claim had no ' connection to California-the injuries took place in
Argentina, the plaintiffs were Argentinian, and the defendant was
German.'72 The Court appears to account for this lack of contacts in its
unnamed reasonableness inquiry, specifically stating that asserting
general personal jurisdiction in the case violates due process "given the
absence of any [state] connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or
victims described in the complaint."1 73
However, these types of concerns in a general jurisdiction analysis
seemed misplaced; such concerns outside of a specific jurisdictional
analysis are typically reserved for the appropriateness of subject matter
jurisdiction-as in Kiobel-and Congress' prescriptive jurisdiction. In
170. Id. at 762 n.20.
171. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Because
we hold that there is ample evidence of an agency relationship between DCAG and
MBUSA, and, thus, that MBUSA's contacts with California may be imputed to DCAG,
we now must turn to the second part of our test: whether the assertion of jurisdiction is
"reasonable."') (internal citations omitted). Justice Sotomayor, in her Daimler
concurrence, suggests this as well. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 765 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
172. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 ("The question presented is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising
jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, given the absence of any California connection to
the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the Complaint."); see also id at 753
("We granted certiorari to decide whether, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Daimler is amenable to suit in California courts for claims
involving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring entirely abroad."); id. at 761
(noting that the case is "Argentina-rooted" in determining such "exorbitant exercises" of
jurisdiction); id at 762 ("It was therefore error for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that
Daimler, even with the MBUSA's contacts attributed to it, was at home in California, and
hence subject to suit there on claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with
anything that occurred or had its principal impact in California.").
173. Id. at 751.
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taking these factors into consideration for general personal jurisdiction,
Justice Ginsburg merges the considerations Congress has the
responsibility to take into account with her general personal jurisdiction
analysis. In so doing, she arguably impedes on Congress' responsibility
to determine causes of action, including causes of action for
extraterritorial conduct. This is especially true given that nothing
impedes Congress from providing claims for extraterritorial conduct.
174
Congress has numerous bases for providing for extraterritorial claims
involving human rights or terror-related claims such as those brought
under the ATS, the ATA, or the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Congress arguably has the power to prohibit and provide for causes of
action for such conduct under the Offenses Clause7 and the Foreign
Commerce Clause.176 Moreover, while some courts have held that the
"Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of extraterritorial subject
matter jurisdiction over a defendant when it would be 'arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair,'"177 due process for these types of claims-
international human rights violations, human trafficking, and
international terrorism-are arguably satisfied under what is known as
the "protective principle," given that all potential defendants are on
notice that conduct giving rise to such claims are prohibited by
international law (and indeed nearly all domestic law).178
174. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
175. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power "[t]o define and
punish .. . Offences against the Law of Nations"); United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651,
666 (11th Cir. 2016).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations"); Baston, 818 F.3d at 668 (Congress's power under
Foreign Commerce Clause included power to regulate channels and instrumentalities
of commerce between United States and other countries, and activities that had
substantial effect on such commerce, including human trafficking).
177. See, e.g., Baston, 818 F.3d at 669 (citing United States v. Ibarguen-
Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011)); see also United States v. Cardales, 168
F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371 (4th Cir.
1982); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) ("If Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the
United States ... a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional
direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."),
abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010).
178. See, e.g., Baston, 818 F.3d at 670 (finding that the TVPA complies with the
"protective principle" of international law, which provides that a country may enact laws
involving extraterritorial criminal conduct that "threatens its security as a state or the
operation of its governmental functions" and "is generally recognized as a crime under
the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems," and noting that the
citizenship of the defendant is irrelevant and that "it does not matter whether the conduct
had 'an actual or intended effect inside the United States' because "[t]he conduct may be
forbidden if it has apotentially adverse effect") (internal citations omitted).
6492017]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Justice Ginsburg seems to recognize this weakness by
acknowledging that the Court of Appeals emphasized the fact that
Congress had enacted the ATS and Torture Victims Protection Act (the
other TVPA)-two causes of action which include extraterritorial
conductl79-but then noting that recent decisions of the Court had
"rendered plaintiffs' ATS and Torture Victims Protect Act claims
infirm." 80 Justice Ginsburg may be responding to anticipated criticism
that Congress has provided for causes of action for these claims and to
justify her considerations of extraterritoriality in her analysis. However,
personal jurisdiction analyses should only concern whether the court can
assert in personam jurisdiction, not the wisdom of Congress' decisions to
provide for claims that arise abroad. Otherwise, serious constitutional
issues regarding balance of power could ensue.
Justice Ginsburg also discusses international comity and notes that,
before Goodyear and Daimler, the United States had very expansive
personal jurisdiction, and that it potentially caused some friction with
other countries.'8 She argues that in the European Union (EU), a
corporation can only be sued where it is domiciled or headquartered.182
However, in many situations, a plaintiff can sue a foreign corporation
outside of its domicile, i.e., in the plaintiffs country, as long as the
corporation is a member of another EU country.183 Additionally, EU
regulations allow citizens of EU countries to sue foreign corporations
that are not members of an EU state for, inter alia, consumer and
employment claims.184 Moreover, she fails to note that the EU rule only
applies to corporations of EU countries.85  In fact, each European
country's own laws on jurisdiction apply to non-EU corporations, and
often those jurisdictional rules can be quite broad, even broader than in
the United States in many instances.86
179. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762-63 (2014).
180. Id. at 763 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669
(2013) (finding the presumption of extraterritorial application applied to claims under the
ATS); Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012) (finding that the
TVPA only applied to natural persons)).
181. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
182. Id. (internal citations omitted).
183. Brussels I recast, supra note 16, at art. 7-24. They involve areas of law such as
insurance, consumer law and employment, contract, and in rem jurisdiction, including
claims involving these subjects where a plaintiff is domiciled in that member state. Id.
Similarly, the regulations allow the courts of a member country to hear tort claims against
a defendant domiciled in the EU if the "harmful event," occurred in that country. Id. at
art. 7(2).
184. Id. at art. 18; see also id at art. 6(1), art. 21(2).
185. Id. at pmbl. § 14; see also id at art. 6.
186. For example, Germany allows for assertions of general jurisdiction over parent
corporations if they have any property-tangible or intangible-located in those
countries, even for cases completely unrelated to the property. Bonacorsi, supra note
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Many might argue, as Justice Ginsburg suggests in her opinion in
Daimler,'87  that most human rights cases against TNCs for
extraterritorial conduct will not survive anyway given Kiobel, so
Goodyear/Daimler does little damage. But this is not true. As
mentioned above, several cases have survived Kiobel, especially where
courts have found that some of the decision-making which led to the
harm took place in the United States. 18  Moreover, Kiobel's most
restrictive limitations on the ATS were imposed by a plurality, not a
majority, of the Court's Justices.189 Thus, Kiobel's strict narrowing of
the ATS could see an expansion as cases involving human rights reach
the Court. Thus, general personal jurisdiction over TNCs will still be
crucial in these human rights cases, and thus limits to general personal
jurisdiction create a significant barrier to victims seeking a remedy for
human rights violations that Congress provided two centuries ago, and
has not repealed or amended.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER
A. Goodyear and Daimler's Effect on Human Rights Cases
Goodyear and Daimler will greatly narrow U.S. courts' jurisdiction
over a transnational corporation where Congress has thought best to
provide for a cause of action, not only in cases under the ATS, but cases
under the ATA and possibly other statutes as well. In the two-and-a-half
years between Goodyear and Daimler, of the approximately 54 cases
filed against corporations or other entities for human rights claims,
190
courts dismissed five on personal jurisdiction grounds, albeit few
specifically rely directly on Goodyear.1 91 However, just since Daimler,
134, at 1835, 1846 (noting that recently, Germany's high court has imposed a
requirement for some sort of national connection) (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO]
[CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
intemet.de/englisch zpo/englischzpo.htmll (Ger.)). The U.K. allows for general
jurisdiction over non-EU businesses that are "doing business," and although courts have
stated some connection to the U.K. is required, courts have not clearly defined what that
entails. Bonacorsi, supra note 134, at 1841. Still other countries allow for jurisdiction
over all defendants, including foreign corporations and their subsidiaries if a court has
jurisdiction over any one of them, assuming the claims are closely connected. Linda
Silberman, Jurisdictional Imputation in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman: A Bridge Too
Far, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 129 (2013).
187. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
188. See supra note 96.
189. See supra note 93.
190. See Kenney Dataset, supra note 83.
191. Id. The cases dismissed included Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11 -CV-2794
KMW, 2013 WL 1234943, at *2-8 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2013) (dismissing case, inter
alia, against corporations and individuals due to insufficient contacts within the United
States); Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing action
6512017]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
courts have dismissed more cases against TNCs for human rights claims
for lack of personal jurisdiction.192
One case that may have survived and thus offered victims a chance
for a remedy had it not been for Goodyear and Daimler is the 2014 case
of Krishanti v. Rajaratnam.193 The case involved claims of aiding and
abetting terrorism and crimes against humanity under the ATS against
individual defendants and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO).
TRO is a Sri Lankan NGO, with a branch in Maryland, which the
plaintiffs alleged supplied substantial funds to Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Elam (LTTE), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, which carried out
terror attacks in Sri Lanka.'94 The plaintiffs alleged that the LTTE, with
help from TRO, engaged in suicide bombings and other murderous
attacks on innocent civilians intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population.1 95  In November of 2007, the United States Treasury
Department described TRO as a "charitable organization that acts as a
front to facilitate fundraising and procurement for the LTTE," and noted
that the branch in Maryland was a larger source of funds to LTTE than
any other TRO branch.19 6
One of the primary issues in the case was whether the court had
general personal jurisdiction over TRO in New Jersey, the court having
rejected specific jurisdiction over TRO.'97 In addition to the branch in
against Hungarian banks for lack of personal jurisdiction); In re Terrorist Attacks on
Sept. 11, 2001, 840 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing ATS/TVPA
case against a Saudi Arabian construction company for lack of personal jurisdiction);
Ivanovic v. Overseas Management Co., No. 11-80726-Civ, 2011 WL 5508824, at *3-4
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011) (dismissing case due to lack of personal jurisdiction over eight
of eleven defendants); Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal, 889 F. Supp. 2d 912, 919-30
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (dismissing case against New York nonprofit for lack of personal
jurisdiction in Texas (and no nationwide service)).
192. Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395 JLL, 2014 WL 1669873, at *7
(D.N.J. 2014) (holding that there was no general jurisdiction over the NGO for ATS and
other claims for aiding and abetting a foreign terrorist organization, despite frequent
contacts, given that the NGO was not "at home" in New Jersey, relying on Goodyear and
Daimler); William v. AE Corp., 28 F. Supp. 3d 553, 563-70 (E.D. Va. 2014) (describing
a lack of general personal jurisdiction over subsidiary under Goodyear analysis).
Although not a human rights case, see also Keeley v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:15CV00583
ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, at *2-4 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (dismissing case brought in
Missouri against Pfizer, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
New York, for birth defects related to Pfizer drug Zoloft, for lack of both general and
personal jurisdiction, relying on Goodyear and Daimler).
193. Krishanti, 2014 VL 1669873, at *1.
194. Id. at *1.
195. Id. at *1, *2.
196. Id.at*1.
197. Id. at *5. The court rejected specific jurisdiction because it found that the
injuries did not arise from TRO's activities in New Jersey, employing a "but for" test. Id.
at *8.
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Maryland, TRO had an office in New Jersey,1' which the plaintiffs
alleged operated as a defacto headquarters for TRO's business activities
within New Jersey; the address, phone number, and fax number of the
New Jersey office were regularly used to promote TRO's activities
within New Jersey; TRO raised a substantial amount of money within
New Jersey between 1997 and 2005; a number of TRO events and
fundraisers were organized in New Jersey at least once a year between
1999 and 2005, each time renting a venue, taking out insurance,
marketing, and recruiting volunteers, all in New Jersey; and TRO's
English-language website operated from New Jersey.199'
After reviewing all of these contacts, the judge found he could not
assert general personal jurisdiction over TRO, specifically relying on
Goodyear and Daimler, because the contacts were not so continuous and
systematic as to render TRO "at home" in New Jersey.2
00 Prior to
Goodyear and Daimler, it is possible, even likely, that the court would
have found it had personal jurisdiction over TRO, given its systematic
and continuous operations in New Jersey. The issue of personal
jurisdiction was particularly important because the court found that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the case, even in light of Kiobel, because
most of the alleged actions occurred in the United States.201 Moreover,
the court rejected motions to dismiss on the grounds of forum non
conveniens and exhaustion of remedies.2 02 Thus, had the court found it
had personal jurisdiction over TRO, the case against TRO would likely
have gone to trial.203
Moreover, nearly all of the cases discussed in Part II, examples of
courts' assertions of general personal jurisdiction over TNCs in human
rights cases, would likely not have survived under Goodyear and
Daimler, resulting in victims failing to obtain remedy, or even the
possibility of seeking a remedy. Cases of particular importance include
Doe v. Exxon,20 4 Manook v. Research. Triangle Institute,
205 and Wiwa v.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *5.
200. Id. at *6-7.
201. Id. at *10-11.
202. Id at *14.
203. Krishanti, 2014 WL 1669873, at *1. The case against two individual defendants,
dual U.S. and Sri Lankan citizens, survived, but it is unclear whether such individuals
have the resources to pay any damage award. See generally id.
204. Doe v. Exxon, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005). Although Exxon is a U.S.
corporation, it was sued in D.C., where it was not headquartered or incorporated.
Moreover, the case against a subsidiary was allowed to proceed under a type of alter-ego
theory, which likely would not have survived Daimler. See supra note 100.
205. Manook v. Research Triangle Inst., 693 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
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Royal Dutch Petroleum Shell.206 For example, Doe v. Exxon has thus far
survived motions to dismiss based on Kiobel, and is pending in D.C.
District Court.2 07  Also, the courts' assertion of general personal
jurisdiction was critical for the victims in Manook, the case involving
claims against a government contractor and a private security firm
(Unity) where security personnel allegedly shot and killed Iraqi citizens
given that the case ultimately settled,208 allowing victims to receive
compensation they may not have otherwise been able to receive, at least
against Unity. It is unlikely the case against Unity would have survived
a motion to dismiss based on Goodyear and Daimler, even with the
extensive contacts and business within the District of Columbia. This
case particularly demonstrates Daimler's impact because the ATS claims
against Unity and the government contractor would likely have survived
Kiobel, given that Unity's work was pursuant to a contract with the U.S.
government for security protection2 09 and thus "touched and concerned"
the United States.
Similarly, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Shell would likely have
been dismissed under Goodyear and Daimler, depriving victims of
compensation, given that Shell agreed to settle the case in 2009.210 And
of course, Daimler itself would likely have survived, although Kiobel's
impact on the case is unknown.
Although there has not yet been an avalanche of cases dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction that would have otherwise survived before
211
Goodyear and Daimler, more will surely be coming. Moreover, there
are many cases that plaintiffs likely have decided not to file against
TNCs in human-rights actions in the wake of Goodyear and Daimler,
and thus the cases have had a chilling effect. In fact, practitioners have
reported that due to Goodyear and Daimler, they are simply not filing
certain human rights cases against foreign corporations or subsidiaries,
206. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). See supra
discussion at Part II.B.
207. See supra note 96.
208. See supra note 98.
209. Manook, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
210. See supra note 99. This case might have been dismissed pursuant to Kiobel, but
such is speculation.
211. One pending human rights case on which Goodyear and Daimler might have
significant impact is John Doe v. Nestle, a case involving forced Malian child labor in the
preparation of Nestle products. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, John Doe v.
Nestle, 2:05-CV-05133-SVW-MRW (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2016). On March 3, 2017, the
district court dismissed the case orally under Kiobel, finding that none of the claims
"touch and concern" the United States with sufficient force. Doe v. Nestle, 2:05-cv-
05133-SVW-MRW (C.D. Cal. March 3,2017).
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even cases that might survive Kiobel, due to lack of general personal
212
jurisdiction over the offending foreign corporation.
B. Goodyear's and Daimler's Effect on Other Human-Rights Related
Claims
In addition to ATS cases, there have been several other human
rights-related cases dismissed or otherwise impacted due to Goodyear
and Daimler 's new restriction on general personal jurisdiction. One area
that has already been implicated by the restricted personal jurisdiction
are civil claims brought by families of terrorism victims under the Anti-
Terrorism Act,213 in which Congress has specifically provided for a cause
of action for terrorism claims, including extraterritorial claims.2 14 U.S.
courts have recently dismissed several cases brought under the ATA
specifically due to Goodyear and Daimler215 that would have otherwise
survived, impacting families' and victims' ability to obtain a remedy for
these violations. Courts have also recently dismissed cases involving
corruption and conspiracy due to Daimler 's "at home" requirement.
216
212. Skinner et al., The Third Pillar, Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights
Violations by Transnational Business 20 (Int'l Corp. Accountability Roundtable, 2013),
http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-
Remedies-for-Human-Rights-Violation-by-Transnational-Business.pdf (citing
consultations with several U.S. human rights practitioners) (last accessed Oct. 20, 2016).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(e) (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries); 18
U.S.C. § 2339(b)(d) (providing material support or resources to designated foreign
terrorist organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 2339(d)(b) (receiving military-type training from a
foreign terrorist organization).
215. See, e.g., Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04 CV 00397(GBD), 2011
WL 1345086, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2011), dismissed sub nom. Waldman v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian
Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239-40 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Leibovitch v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp. 3d 734 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding it did not have personal
jurisdiction over a foreign bank for purposes of discovery, even though it would have
before Daimler, leaving the plaintiffs unable to collect a default judgment); Simowitz,
supra note 10, at 24-25 (noting the impact of Daimler on ATA cases).
It should be noted, however, that some courts have found personal jurisdiction
over defendants in terrorism-related cases post-Daimler, under specific jurisdiction
theories. See, e.g., Licci v. Leb. Can. Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2013); Weiss v.
Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 176 F. Supp. 3d 264, 281, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Strauss v.
Cr6dit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp. 3d 3, 23 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
216. For example, in the pending case of Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 456,
458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) involving RICO, conspiracy, and related torts against executives
of foreign corporation, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie
showing of general jurisdiction over two of the individual defendants given Daimler's "at
home" requirement. Id. at 458-59 (the court, however, allowed jurisdictional discovery
to further establish personal jurisdiction). Another example is In re LIBOR-Based Fin.
Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 11-MDL-2262-NRB, 2015 WL 6243526, at *1
(S.D.N.Y Oct. 20, 2015), a case involving foreign banks that engaged in interest rate
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There are likely to be even more implications of Goodyear and
Daimler under other claims, including the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act, which provides a cause of action against perpetrators, including
anyone who knowingly benefits from trafficking that affects international
commerce.217 The TVPA's civil remedy exists for violations of the
TVPA, and Congress intended that causes of actions under the TVPA
include extraterritorial violations.218 If a victim, including one who is
trafficked in the United States, brings suit against a foreign corporation
under the TVPA, including against a TNC doing significant business in
the United States, the victim may well be out of luck even though
Congress intended such victims to be able to obtain a remedy. Indeed, at
least one case suggests that personal jurisdiction may be an issue in
future TVPA litigation.2 19
C. Narrow Jurisdiction Over TNCs Stands in Stark Contrast o
Transient, or "Tag, " Jurisdiction over Individuals.
It is important to note that natural persons can be subjected to a
court's jurisdiction simply by being served while within the state in
which the court sits-even if just passing through on one occasion-
something called "transient" (or "tag")220 jurisdiction.221 In fact, courts
manipulation, where the court found it could not assert general personal jurisdiction over
the defendants in accordance with Daimler and Goodyear, despite their presence and
operation in the United States because they could not be considered "at home" there. Id.
at *24-27.
Others have raised concerns of Daimler's implication on other types of cases as
well, such as arbitration under the FSIA and patent infringements. See, e.g., Simowitz,
supra note 10, at 40-41.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1595; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1590; 18 U.S.C. § 1584; 18
U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1589, 1591, 1596 (setting forth violations that can be sued upon, without
any extraterritorial limits).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 667 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting
that the TVPA applies extraterritorially); see also Sonia Merzon, Note, The
Extraterritorial Reach of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 887, 913-15 (2007) (documenting how Congress intended the TVPA to apply to
extraterritorial conduct).
219. See Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107, 121-22 (D.D.C. 2012)
(holding, in dicta, that although the case involved an individual defendant, the court could
assert personal jurisdiction over him even though he was physically in Tanzania, given
that "he had attended the George Washington University School of Business in
Washington, D.C.," which the court found established a sufficient contact) (citing Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
220. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting
that this kind of jurisdiction is often referred to as "tag jurisdiction").
221. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically authorize jurisdiction where
there has been personal service of a summons and complaint upon an individual
physically present within a judicial district of the United States, and the Supreme Court
found such complied with due process in Burnham v. Superior
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have found personal jurisdiction over nonresident individual defendants
in human rights cases, such as the self-proclaimed president of Serbia,
proper for having served the defendant while he was temporarily in the
jurisdiction.2 22 However, nearly all courts have found that tag
jurisdiction does not apply to corporations.223 The argument is that
unlike natural persons, who can physically be in one place and thus a
court can physically assert power over him or her, corporations can only
act through their agents and can be in many places simultaneously.224 As
Justice Scalia noted in Burnham,225 corporations "have never fitted
comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily upon 'de facto
power over the defendant's person,"'226 citing International Shoe.
However, the reasoning that the various Justices who wrote
plurality opinions in Burnham gave for justifying tag jurisdiction over
individuals also holds true for corporations. Justice Scalia wrote the
plurality opinion, noting that transient jurisdiction had been around since
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Notably, the same section also
allows.service of summons on an agent authorized to receive service, but after Goodyear
and Daimler, that provision is essentially invalid with regard to foreign corporations.
222. See Kadic v. Karadiid, 70 F.3d 232, 247 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding personal
jurisdiction over Defendant Karadiid, who was served while visiting New York, on the
basis of Burnham, and finding that "personal service comports with the requirements of
due process for the assertion of personal jurisdiction"), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996).
223. See, e.g., Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1067-69 (holding that tag jurisdiction over the
defendant does not extend jurisdiction to the defendant's corporation, despite the
defendant acting on behalf of the corporation at the time of service of process, and that
International Shoe and all Supreme Court decisions since have assumed tag jurisdiction
does not apply to corporations); Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 182-
83 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that Burnham did not authorize tag jurisdiction based on in-
state service on a corporation's registered agent). But see N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N.
Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 63 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating in a footnote that service on a
corporation's president conferred general personal jurisdiction over the corporation,
without explaining its decision or citing any supporting case). In First Am. Corp. v. Price
Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998), the court held that tag jurisdiction over
PW-UK, a "worldwide" company was proper regarding a third party subpoena because
PW-UK's partner was properly served within the forum, relying on the notion that
service on one partner is service upon the partnership. See id. at 23. It does not appear
that the court considered the argument that because Price Waterhouse was a corporation,
Burnham did not apply. Moreover, Price Waterhouse addressed a third-party subpoena,
not service of a summons and complaint. A later opinion in a federal district court within
the Second Circuit, Estate of Unger v. Palestinian Auth., 400 F. Supp. 2d 541 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), clarified that tag jurisdiction did not apply to corporations, noting that "'tag'
jurisdiction-personal service on an individual within the state-remains a valid method
of acquiring personal jurisdiction over an individual, though not over a corporation
through the persons of its officers," distinguishing Price Waterhouse. Id. at 553.
224. See Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1067-69; Siemer, 966 F.2d at 182-83.
225. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
226. Id. at 610 n.1 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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the adoption of the 14f Amendment and was too ingrained in the
American legal system to be considered a violation of due process.22 7
This can also be said of corporations. Before Goodyear and Daimler, it
was ingrained in the legal system that courts could assert jurisdiction
over corporations doing business, and after International Shoe,
continuous and systematic business in the state. As Justice Scalia noted,
every nation ought to be able to "rightfully exercise jurisdiction over all
persons within its domains."228
Justice Brennan wrote another opinion in Burnham, joined by three
justices.22 9 He rejected Justice Scalia's historical justification, noting
that asserting personal jurisdiction must meet. modern due process.23 0
However, he found the assertion of jurisdiction in the case proper
because (1) individual defendants are on notice that they could be served
while in the state; (2) individuals traveling to the. state are subjecting
themselves to the protection of the state, so asserting jurisdiction over
them is fair; (3) modern technology makes it less burdensome for
nonresident defendants to defend themselves in another state's courts;
and (4) the doctrine of forum non conveniens was always available to the
defendant.2 3 1 The same is true of corporations. Just as courts ought to be
able to assert general personal jurisdiction over natural persons who are
served while "passing through" the court's jurisdiction, courts ought to
be able to assert general personal jurisdiction over transnational
corporations that are served while "doing business" in a state. This
difference of a courts' ability to assert jurisdiction over individuals "just
passing through" versus TNCs highlights the unfairness of current
jurisdictional doctrine. This is true even though, arguably, such
individuals would have a much more difficult time defending a case
outside their domicile than a transnational corporation doing significant
business in a particular state.
227. Id. at 622.
228. Id. at 611 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 543 (3d ed. 1846)).
229. Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 632.
231. Id. at 632-39.
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V. MORE EXPANSIVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER TNCs is
REASONABLE AND FAIR.
A. Harmed Individuals Often Have a Difficult Time Accessing
Remedies in Host Countries for Human Rights Violations, Thereby
Absorbing All the Costs While TNCs Benefit.
While most TNCs benefit host countries through direct investment,
creation of infrastructure, increased employment, and decreased
poverty,2 a few others act in violation of international human rights or
environmental laws, either directly, vicariously, or in concert with
government security forces, local police, state-run businesses, or local
businesses. Such behavior often wreaks havoc on local, vulnerable
communities. Where such behavior occurs in countries with weak and
fragile governments and judiciaries, the victims of these violations are
often unable to obtain any compensation for their injuries against a TNC,
whether it is the parent or a subsidiary operating in the host country.
First, many countries hosting subsidiaries that engage in extraction
or other industries have a high potential for human rights abuses, but
have ineffectual and corrupt judicial systems, or no mechanisms for
victims harmed by businesses' actions to seek or obtain redress.233
232. See David Shea Bettwy, Human Rights and Wrongs of Foreign Direct
Investment: Addressing the Need for an Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
Bus. 239, 243, 249-51 (2012) (noting that FDI produces socio-economic benefits,
environmental benefits, and human rights benefits).
233. See Catherine J. Boggs, Project Management: A Smorgasbord of International
Operating Risks § 3.0 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst., Paper No. 13, 2008) (describing the
challenges corporations face "in countries where bribery and corruption are endemic and
appear firmly ensconced as a part of customary business practices"); Jodie A. Kirshner,
Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?:
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 259,
266-67 (2012) (noting how many host countries often lack functioning legal systems or
may not have sufficient resources to bring multinationals to justice). The fact that many
host countries involved in the extraction industry have corrupt or ineffective judicial
systems, and that human rights are often violated with impunity, is also confirmed by the
U.S. Department of State. See generally Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2013, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. & LAB., (2013),
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013humanrightsreport/ (evaluating human-rights
practices in various countries). For example, the report for the Democratic Republic of
the Congo lists "lack of an independent and effective judiciary; and impunity throughout
the country for many serious abuses, including unlawful killings, disappearances, torture,
rapes, and arbitrary arrests and detention" as two of the country's three most severe
human rights problems. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. & LAB.,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2013). The report
for Nigeria notes that "[i]mpunity remained widespread at all levels of government," and
notes various issues: that political leaders influenced the judiciary, particularly at the
state and local levels; that understaffing, underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption
continued to prevent the judiciary from functioning adequately; that judges frequently fail
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Second, sometimes there is simply no statutory or common law basis to
bring a claim.34 Third, it might be that victims bring a suit against the
subsidiary in the host state and receive a verdict, but are then unable to
collect due to lack of funds, underfunding, or bankruptcy.235 Fourth, due
to the complexity of corporate structure, sometimes victims are simply
unable to identify which subsidiary is operating in their area and, thus,
are unable to determine which entity to bring a claim against.2 3 6 What
can be even more confusing is that the subsidiary may be using the
"logo" of the parent company, leading to confusion about the entity
operating in the area and thus responsible, as has been reported to have
occurred in Nigeria with Shell (trucks owned by the subsidiary had the
Shell logo on the side) in Kiobel.237
Fifth, victims may have legitimate fears of retaliation by the
business or the members of the community if they bring a claim.238
Finally, victims may also find that bringing a lawsuit may be too costly
given lack of contingency fee arrangements and loser pay rules, or they
may simply be unable to find a lawyer in that country willing to bring a
to appear for trials, often because they were pursuing other sources of income and
sometimes because of threats against them; and that there was a widespread perception
that judges were easily bribed and litigants could not rely on the courts to render
impartial judgments. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. & LAB.,
NIGERIA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2, 12-13 (2013). The report on Guatemala notes
that "[p]rincipal human rights abuses included widespread institutional corruption,
particularly in the police and judicial sectors" and "[t]he judicial system failed to provide
fair or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient personnel, and
intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, H.R. & LAB., GUATEMALA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1, 7 (last updated
March 18, 2014).
234. See Skinner, Beyond Kiobel, supra note 11, at 227 (explaining how "[c]hoice of
law" principles can "create unforeseen barriers to recovery").
235. Id. at 233-34.
236. See id. at 244 ("For example, parent companies over which the courts have
jurisdiction may deny any involvement in subsidiaries' actions, yet often will not produce
information regarding the subsidiaries, including information regarding their
relationships to the subsidiaries."); see also Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability, supra
note 11, at 1802 nn.113-14.
237. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013); Skinner,
Rethinking Limited Liability, supra note 11, at 1802 n. 114 (noting reports of how trucks
of Shell's Nigerian subsidiary had the Shell logo on their side).
238. See Skinner, Beyond Kiobel, supra note 11, at 172, 231-34 (discussing how the
potential for "unwarranted counterclaims or retaliatory claims," id at 232, can dissuade
victims from bringing human rights claims).
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suit in court. 23 9 All of these factors converge to create a situation where
240victims are likely to have little recourse in their own countries.
Yet, it is clear that TNCs gain enormous financial benefits by
operating globally,241 especially when operating within countries that
have few regulatory mechanisms to ensure corporations and their
subsidiaries are complying with human rights and environmental norms
and laws.242 While these transnational corporations tand to benefit
greatly from their work in less developed or developing countries, it is
often the local, most vulnerable populations and communities--often
nonconsenting to the development-who absorb most of the costs
associated with this economic activity in the form of lower labor and
regulatory costs, environmental damage, and civil and human rights
violations. 243 Given the power of TNCs and the increasing difficultly to
239. See id at 172, 233 (noting how the "loser pays" system common in host
countries can serve as a barrier to representation).
240. See id. at 172 (recognizing that "victims .. . would much rather bring cases in
the host countries as long as the judiciary was fair, stable, and effective, and the victims
felt safe bringing such claims").
241. See Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by Multinational
Companies on Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 816-17 (2011) (describing
advantages of low labor costs and lenient regulatory regimes); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et
al., Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79, 84-85 (2009) (describing how their use of
foreign subsidiaries provides U.S. resident corporations with "overly generous tax
benefits" and providing examples); Christopher H. Hanna, Corporate Tax Reform:
Listening to Corporate America, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 283, 298-99 (2009) (describing
significant tax advantages of global business and operating through foreign subsidiaries,
such as the tax advantages of deferral of income earned by a foreign subsidiary);
Christopher H. Hanna, The Real Value of Tax Deferral, 61 FLA. L. REv. 203, 231-33
(2009) (describing additional tax-related benefits of transnational businesses, such as
advantageous accounting rules).
242. See Chow, supra note 241; Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-
Regulation in a Global Economy, 2 TECH., Bus. & Soc'Y 1, 1 (2001) (describing the
major shift in the "will and ability" of developing countries to control the activities of
multinational corporations (MNCs), and the emphasis on attracting them over regulating
them).
243. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1584-87, 1613-23, 1637-40 (1991) (discussing corporations'
externalization of costs to reap benefits from their subsidiaries' potentially abusive
conduct in host country); Kiarie Mwaura, Internalization of Costs to Corporate Groups:
Part-Whole Relationships, Human Rights Norms and the Futility of the Corporate Veil,
11 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 85, 85-86 (2012) (explaining how victims of human rights abuses
often absorb the costs of those abuses); Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, How Can the United
States Correct Multi-National Corporations' Environmental Abuses Committed in the
Name of Trade?, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 51, 53-54 (2004) (noting corporations
externalize the costs of doing business while enjoying the benefits); Mark J. Roe,
Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1, 39-56 (1986) (examining
the practice of externalizing the risks of a subsidiary operating in a host country to allow
the parent corporation to avoid liability as a result of actions taken by subsidiary); Robert
B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1, 29-39 (1994) (discussing
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hold those few that commit human rights violations accountable for
harm,244 there simply needs to be a paradigm shift regarding numerous
doctrines, including personal jurisdiction. Where the parent or lead
company is headquartered or domiciled in the United States, victims may
be able to bring a claim against the parent if the victims can establish the
parent's responsibility. But the difficulty exists where the parent or lead
company is not headquartered or domiciled in a country that would allow
the victims to bring a claim. Where such TNCs do business in the
United States, expansive jurisdictional rules would allow victims to seek
a remedy in the United States against these TNCs where Congress has
otherwise provided for causes of action allowing victims to seek such a
remedy for extraterritorial conduct.
Although a similar paradigm shift is also needed in Europe and
elsewhere, such jurisdictional expansion is particularly important in the
United States. This is because victims face even greater challenges in
seeking and obtaining a remedy in Europe or Canada, for a variety of
reasons. These include a lack of causes of action for human rights
245 4violations, lack of contingency fees, loser pay rules,246 damage
corporations' externalization of costs to reap benefits from their subsidiaries' potentially
abusive conduct in host country); Meredith Dearborn, Comment, Enterprise Liability:
Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 195, 205-
07 (2009) (noting the large benefits corporations gain from host country's subsidiaries'
risky conduct while only bearing some of the costs).
244. For example, in Kiobel, the Court significantly limited accountability of
transnational corporations by greatly limiting U.S. federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction over violations of international human rights law that occurred abroad. See
discussion supra Part II.A. In another U.S. Supreme Court case, Mohamad v. Palestinian
Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012), the Supreme Court held that claims brought under the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) applied only to individuals-natural persons-
and not corporations. In non-human rights cases, the Supreme Court has issued other
opinions which enhance the power of corporations over individuals, such as the decisions
in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See also Adam Liptak, Chief Justice's Report Praises Limits on
Litigants' Access to Information, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/01/0 1/us/politics/chief-justices-report-praises-limits-on-claimants-access-to-
information.html?_r-0 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's praise of the limits on
discovery in favor of corporations).
245. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel, supra note 11, at 193-95. The U.K. has seen some
success in human rights claims being litigated as common law torts, which is the only
real avenue available in most of Europe and Canada. See Michael D. Goldhaber,
Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 127, 130-34 (2013) (noting U.K. cases filed as torts). See also
Kirshner, supra note 233, at 279-82 (noting tort actions in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland).
One exception is Switzerland where, in theory, it is possible for courts to
entertain claims against Swiss businesses for violations of international law. See Gypsy
Int'l Recognition and Comp. Action (GIRCA) v. IBM, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal
Supreme Court] Dec. 22, 2004, 131 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN
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formulas that result in less monetary relief,2 47 shorter statutes of
limitations,2 48 limited ability for collective action,24 9 and more restrictive
discovery rules.25 0  Given the ATS and the relief it offers, and the
generally more plaintiff-friendly legal culture in the United States, such
limitations in Europe and Canada make personal jurisdiction even more
important in the United States.
B. Current Jurisdictional Rules do not Reflect How TNCs are
Structured and Operate, Allowing TNCs that Violate International
Human Rights Norms to Escape any Meaningful Accountability.
Second, rules restricting assertions of personal jurisdiction over
TNCs do not reflect how TNCs are structured and operate in today's
world. Indeed, "a classic obstacle involving litigation against
transnational businesses is that corporate groups are organized as a
network of distinct legal entities."251 Not only are such entities
extremely complex and often lack transparency regarding their structure,
they are increasingly amorphous. In today's global world, related legal
entities within a transnational business enterprise are frequently without
clear definitions, and often exist without obvious "parent" entities whose
domicile or place of incorporation can easily be determined by even the
most sophisticated actors. In fact, many organizations addressing similar
problems with TNCs are beginning to drop the term "parent company"
altogether, using other terms such as "lead company," given this
reality.252 Truth be told, most countries' legal systems are simply no
match for these increasingly massive, complex, and amorphous legal
structures.
BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 153 (Switz.). In that case, GIRCA alleged that IBM had
been complicit in the crimes against humanity the Nazis committed against the Roma
between 1933 and 1945. The Federal Court (Tribunal Federal) recognized that the Swiss
courts had jurisdiction to hear the case, but dismissed it after finding too much time had
elapsed. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Aug. 14, 2006, 132
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 661, 668 (Switz.).
However, GIRCA is an important precedent for the filing of claims against companies
operating in Switzerland which are alleged to have been involved in human rights
violations extraterritorially.
246. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel, supra note 11, at 233.
247. Id. at 227-28.
248. Id. at 231.
249. Id. at 242.
250. Id. at 245-47.
251. Id. at 215. See also Kirshner, supra note 233, at 266-67 (noting how
multinational corporations structure themselves to avoid a court's jurisdiction, and how
they can shift financial assets within a corporate group).
252. See Gwynne L. Skinner, Notes of Discussion on Advancing Parent Company
Accountability: A Roadmap for Policy and Legal Reform, from Int'l Corp.
Accountability Roundtable, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 7, 2016) (notes on file with author).
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A description of the varied types of complex business structures
employed by large, transnational businesses is outside the scope of this
Article. However, a few key facts about corporate growth and structure
are important to note, given the current jurisdictional paradigm's focus
on the "home" (or in Europe, the domicile) of a corporation-a paradigm
that is based on dated notions of how TNCs are structured.
Transnational business, including the number of "parent" (or lead)
corporations and subsidiaries, has exploded over the last 40 years, with
much of the expansion taking place in developing countries as those
countries have sought to attract transnational business.253 In 1970, there
were approximately 7,000 transnational corporations in the world; that
number grew to 30,000 by 1990, to 63,000 by 2000, and to 82,000 by
2009.254 Today, there are more than 100,000 multinational corporations
with over 900,000 foreign affiliates.255 Moreover, as companies grow in
size and expand' overseas, the number of subsidiaries tends to increase
and companies'. structures become even more complex.2 56 For example,
even as long ago as 1984, British Petroleum had numerous sub-holding
companies and over 1,200 subsidiaries.257 One can visualize the
immense complexity of corporate structures, including "parents,"
subsidiaries, affiliates, and "related entities" of numerous TNCs by
referring to Bloomberg Law, Companies and Markets, and Corporate
Hierarchies.258 The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development cannot even compile complete and accurate financial data
on transnational corporations because of their complexity, their number
253. See Ramon Torrent & Federico Lavopa, Strengthening Enforcement of Core
Labour Rights: Can a New Investment Agreement Model Help Multinational
Corporations Be More Socially Responsible?, in CORP. Soc. RESPONSIBILITY IN LATIN
AM.: A COLLECTION OF RESEARCH PAPERS FROM THE UNCTAD VIRTUAL INST. NETWORK
101, 105 (2010) (describing the major shift in "the will and the ability" of developing
countries to control the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs), and the emphasis
on attracting them over regulating them) (citing Jenkins, supra note 242, at 1).
254. U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, World Investment Report 2009:
Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Development and Production, xxi, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (July 2009).
255. Damiano de Felice, Business and Human Rights Indicators to Measure the
Corporate Responsibility to Respect: Challenges and Opportunities, 37 HuM. RTS. Q.
511, 517 (2015).
256. DELOITTE, GOVERNANCE OF SUBSIDIARIES: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL COMPANIES 3
(2013), http://www2 .deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documents/risk/Corporate%20
Governance/in-gc-goveance-of-subsidiaries-a-survey-of-global-companies-noexp.pdf
257. Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability ofMultinational Corporations: The Barriers
Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 297, 303 (2001) [hereinafter Accountability of Multinational Corp.] (citing
Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 271, 274 (1984)).
258. BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ (last visited October 7,
2016).
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of categorizations of holding companies, and the fact that a subsidiary
can be owned by multiple parent corporations.2 59
Over the last several decades, as TNCs have grown and created
other corporations, they have rapidly changed form, with the emergence
of complex multi-tiered corporate structures that include numerous
affiliated entities that collectively conduct the business of the
enterprise.260  Even the "complex" corporate structures described a
decade ago by a well-known scholar as "multi-tiered multinational
corporate group[s] function with a parent corporation, sub-holding
companies, and scores or hundreds of subsidiary corporations organized
under the laws of countries around the globe,"26' no longer completely
captures the changing structures and complexities of TNCs over the last
couple of decades. This hierarchal, pyramid approach, with a parent
company at the top and numerous subsidiaries-typically used by Anglo-
American and British companies262-although itself complex, is now
dated and becoming quickly obsolete.2 6 3 Yet, as one well-known scholar
of corporate structure notes, this is the typical model that judges and
policy-makers had (and continue to have) in mind when thinking about
regulation and legal doctrines pertaining to TNCs.264
Although there have been numerous types of corporate structures,
such as those based on geographic division, product division, functional
division, international division, or a combination thereof with various
259. Transnational Corporations Statistics, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
http;//unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-Corporations-Statistics.aspx (last visited
Oct. 10, 2015).
260. Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573,
604 (1986).
261. See Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corp., supra note 257, at 300,
303. See also William D. Dexter, Attribution of a Multinational Corporation's Net
Income: The Position of the Unitary States Regarding Combined Reporting, 18 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 311, 314 (1985) (noting the complexity of the modem business structure,
including (1) the size and international scope of business operations; (2) developments in
business organization, operation and structure, such as conglomeration; (3)
diversification; (4) use of affiliated corporations to hold property and/or to conduct
business; (5) substantial income from investments in intangible assets; (6) treatment of
each corporation, irrespective of control or ownership by another, as a distinct legal
entity; (7) technological changes in the way businesses are being conducted; and (8)
different kinds and levels of control exercised by a multinational corporation over its
various operating divisions and/or affiliated corporations).
262. PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 56 (2d ed.
2007).
263. Id.
264. Id. The Anglo-American "pyramid group" type of structure consists of a parent
company which owns and controls a network of wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries,
which may themselves be intermediate holding companies for sub-groups of closely held
subsidiaries. The resulting structure is that of a "pyramid" with the parent company at its
apex. As noted above, when the "pyramid" crosses borders, this represents the "classic"
conception of the MNE which underlies much of the thinking on MNE regulation. Id.
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branches and subsidiaries,265 many multinational companies employ the
"matrix division" structure, the "most complex" of the international
organizational structures.266 In "matrix division," a company's reporting
relationships are set up as a grid, or matrix, rather than in the traditional
hierarchy.2 67 This more recent shift away from a hierarchical, vertical
control structure has also been referred to as "heterarchical.'268  This
change has resulted in the blurring of corporate-entity boundaries. As
one corporate-structure scholar has described,
The trend towards 'heterarchy' may lead firms to spread certain
functions geographically across the enterprise . .. the firm itself could
be reorganized into smaller, self-standing units of decision-takers
who will come together in a mix that fits the business tasks that the
firm faces, without creating permanent organizational structures . . .
the organizational boundaries between individual firms themselves
will begin to blur, as increased numbers of strategic alliances are
formed.
Forbes has also noted this trend regarding business entities and their
suppliers, noting that, "In the past, strict hierarchical control of suppliers
was necessary. Yet MNCs now need to operate as integrators of a
loosely coupled, autonomous and geographically dispersed system of
production."270
With mergers, things are even more complex-often there is not
one main "parent" company. With mergers involving European
companies, often there is "the creation of a twin holding company
located in each home state, based on joint shareholding by the founding
parent companies, and the transfer of operating activities to subsidiaries
that may be jointly or separately owned and controlled by the holding
265. Michigan State University's International Business Center has a simplified
tutorial on organizational structures of multinational corporations. GlobaIEDGE,
Organizational Structure of MAVCs, MICH. STATE UNIV. INT'L Bus. CTR.,
https://globaledge.msu.edu/content/onlinecoursemodules/33/organizational-structure-of-
mncs/player.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
266. MucHLINsKI, supra note 262, at 47.
267. Sarianna M. Lundan, The Coevolution of Transnational Corporations and
Institutions, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 639 (2011). Many transnational
corporations have recently employed the "M-Form" model, a structure that increases the
number of "outside" suppliers a corporation uses. Id. at 640.
268. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 262, at 46.
269. Id. at 48. This new approach to corporate organization has been followed in
recent years by several leading MNEs, including BP, among others. Id.
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companies."2 71  This was how Royal Dutch Shell was structured until
2005.272
Transnational financial institutions pose special complexities in
their structure.273 Because there are stricter requirements for the
subsidiaries of financial institutions, many banks either open a branch or
satellite abroad, and many are transforming their subsidiaries into
satellites, in order to avoid these stricter regulations.274 Branches can
typically transfer capital and liquid assets across national borders with
little regulation, and thus little transparency.275
Current jurisdictional paradigms based on a place of domicile or
"home" simply do not match how TNCs are structured and operate
today. Thus, expansion of personal jurisdiction over TNCs is both
reasonable and fair.
VI. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REQUIRE TNCS DOING BUSINESS IN
THE UNITED STATES TO CONSENT TO GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION FOR FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION.
Given the complex corporate structure of transnational corporations,
Daimler and Goodyear's limitation of a court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant will limit victims' ability to hold
transnational corporations accountable and obtain a remedy even where
Congress has, provided one because, in many cases, courts will not be
able to assert personal jurisdiction over the corporate entity responsible
for the harm. Such is true even though the responsible corporate entity
has significant presence in the United States and engages in significant
economic activity within the United States. In fact, transnational
corporations with headquarters abroad do more business in the United
States than in any other country in the world.276 Transnational businesses
from the United Kingdom do the most business in the United States,
followed by Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Luxemburg, Germany,
Switzerland, and France.277 Foreign-owned factories based in the United
271. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 262, at 59.
272. Id.
273. Tobias H. Troger, Organizational Choices of Banks and the Effective
Supervision of Transnational Financial institutions, 48 TEX. INT'L L.J. 177 (2012).
274. Id. at 181.
275. Id. at 182, 196.
276. See ORG. FOR INT'L INV., FOREIGN DIRECT INV. IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016
REPORT 2 (2016), http://ofii.org/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Direct%20Investment
%20in%20the%20United%2OStates%202016%2OReport.pdf (last accessed Sept. 2,
2016). This is true on a cumulative basis; it has been true every year except for 2014,
when flows into China and Hong Kong exceeded the United States, primarily due to the
disinvestment of Vodofone (U.K. business). Id. at 3.
277. Id. at 3.
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States also export billions of dollars' worth of goods made in the United
States; in 2008, such was nearly a fifth of all U.S. exports."2 7 8
A. Congress Should Enact a Statute Requiring All TNCs that Do
Business in the United States to Consent o Personal Jurisdiction
Where Congress Has Provided a Claim for Extraterritorial
Conduct.
For all the reasons outlined above, this Article suggests that just as
U.S. courts responded to changes in corporate structure and operations
by expanding jurisdiction in the late 1800s and early 1900s, Congress
should do the same now to account for analogous changes in TNCs and
their operations. However, because Daimler and Goodyear are decisions
based on the Constitution, Congress' actions are limited. For example,
Congress cannot simply enact a statute providing that all corporations
that do substantial and continuous business in the United States are
subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Such would likely be
considered unconstitutional legislation. Therefore, Congress will
necessarily need to accomplish expanded personal jurisdiction by
requiring the consent of TNCs doing business in the United States.2 79
Specifically, Congress should respond to Daimler and Goodyear by
expanding jurisdiction, requiring any transnational businesses "doing
business" in the United States to explicitly consent to general personal
jurisdiction of U.S. courts where Congress has provided for a cause of
action for extraterritorial conduct. Although Congress could then
statutorily determine what constitutes "doing business," it should include
conducting business through the existence of a U.S. subsidiary-
essentially addressing the limitation set forth in Daimler. Although a full
analysis is outside the scope of this Article, the European Union,
European countries, and Canada should also similarly expand personal
jurisdiction over transnational corporations.2 8 0  This is both because
278. See Deborah Orr, The Largest Foreign Investments in the US., FORBES (Apr. 10,
2008, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/10/foreign-investment-stocks-2000glob
a108-biz-cx-do 041 Oinvestments.html.
279. At least two scholars have recently recommended that individual states could
and should take this course of action where the state has some interest, such as where the
harm occurs in the state or the plaintiffs reside in the state. Cassandra Burke Robertson
& Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction,
Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv.
643, 661-66 (2015) [hereinafter Robertson & Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium].
280. Specifically, the EU should revise its regulations regarding jurisdiction to ensure
that it has jurisdiction over any entity that does substantial business in an EU state so that
where causes of action for extraterritorial conduct exist, EU state courts have the ability
to hear and adjudicate the claim. Similarly, European States should also ensure they have
jurisdiction over transnational corporations that do significant business within them.
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doing so would create a more even playing field for each region's
transnational business, and so that there becomes a true transnational
personal jurisdiction over TNCs.
Although this Article proposes that Congress provide for general
jurisdiction only for federal claims, it might be feasible to require such
consent in cases in federal court involving diversity jurisdiction
whenever a cause of action exists for extraterritorial conduct, even if
provided for by the states. This would also address some of the
limitations in specific personal jurisdiction set forth in Nicastro.
However, to the degree that the Fifth Amendment applies to federal
courts' assertions of personal jurisdiction when the claim involves a
federal cause of action rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, personal
jurisdiction only for federal claims may best withstand scrutiny.281
It remains undecided whether individual states can constitutionally
require corporations doing business within it to consent to general
personal jurisdiction through registering their business in the state and
appointing an agent.282 Before Daimler, several courts found that
registration to do business and appointment of an agent constituted
consent for specific personal jurisdiction.283 However, numerous courts
Canada has more expansive jurisdiction than the United States does now post-Daimler.
See gererally supra note 24 (discussing jurisdiction in Canada). However, Canada
should expand even this more expansive jurisdiction to ensure that it has claims over
transnational corporations doing business in Canada, so that where Canada has provided
causes of action that include extraterritorial actions, Canadian courts can adjudicate the
claims.
281. See, e.g., Simowitz, supra note 10, at 6 (noting arguments that Fifth Amendment
applies to federal court's assertion of general personal jurisdiction, which is arguably less
restrictive). However, given that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure base even federal
courts' jurisdiction on whether the state court would have jurisdiction, it may well be,
however, that the Fourteenth Amendment applies regardless. See FED. R. CIV. P. (4)(k).
282. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestie, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 1343 (2015) (questioning the constitutionality
of state registration statutes as implied consent to general personal jurisdiction in light of
Goodyear and Daimler); see also Robertson & Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium, supra
note 279, at 649, 673 (questioning whether states provide for general personal
jurisdiction); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 637 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[T]he
analysis that now governs general jurisdiction over foreign corporations . . . suggests that
federal due process rights likely constrain an interpretation that transforms a run-of-the-
mill registration and appointment statute into a corporate 'consent'-perhaps unwitting-
to the exercise of general jurisdiction by state courts . . . ."). But see Acorda Therapeutics
Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 767-68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that
"International Shoe and Daimler did not overrule th[e] historic and oft-affirmed line of
binding precedent" that "the appointment of an agent by a foreign corporation for service
of process could subject it to general personal jurisdiction") (O'Malley, J., concurring),
cert. denied sub nom. Mylan Pharms. v. Acorda Therapeutics, 137 S. Ct. 625 (2017).
283. See Monestie, supra note 282, at 1369 (citing Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey,
Inc., 739 F.2d 695, 696-99 (1st Cir. 1984); Grey Line Tours v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g
Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring
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also found that consent to general personal jurisdiction by way of
registration and appointment of an agent for service was constitutional,284
with the circuit courts split on the issue.285 Moreover, several courts
Oil Co., 162 So. 756, 757-59 (La. 1935); Springle v. Cottrell Eng'g Corp., 391 A.2d 456,
459-69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 328 N.W.2d 467, 469-70
(Neb. 1982); Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Interstate Pipe Co., 253 P. 66, 69 (Okla. 1926);
Eure v. Morgan Jones & Co., 79 S.E.2d 862, 863-68 (Va. 1954)).
284. See Monestie, supra note 282 at 1359, 1369 (citing Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925
F.2d 637, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1991); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196,
1199-2000 (8th Cir. 1990); Bohreer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 165 P.3d 186, 191-94 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007); Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109-16 (Del. 1988); Confederation of
Can. Life Ins. Co. v. Vega y Arminan, 144 So. 2d 805, 808-10 (Fla. 1962); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 864-65 (Ga. 1992); Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146
P.3d 162,170-77 (Kan. 2006); Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. Am. Appraisal Assoc., 469 N.W.2d
88, 89-91 (Minn. 1991); Read v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So. 2d 1229, 1230-31
(Miss. 1987); Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 576 A.2d 942, 943-45 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990); Werner v. Prins, 861 P.2d 271, 272-74 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991); Augsbury Corp. v. Petrokey Corp., 470 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983); Simmers v. Am. Cyanamid Corp., 576 A.2d 376, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Green
Mountain Coll. v. Levine, 139 A.2d 822, 824-25 (Vt. 1958)). As Professor Monestie
points out, "courts differ on whether it is the act of registering to do business or the act of
appointing an agent for service of process that constitutes consent to personal
jurisdiction." See id. at 1359 n.86 (citing Sadler v. Hallsmith SYSCO Food Servs., No.
08-4423 (RBK/JS), 2009 WL 1096309, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2009) ("Finally, the Court
finds that even if, as Defendants maintain, Plaintiffs did not serve Hallsmith's registered
agent in New Jersey, the Court would still have jurisdiction. While the language
of Allied Signal suggests that the act of serving a corporation's registered agent confers
jurisdiction on the courts of a state, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has instead stated
that the act of registering to do business constitutes consent to be sued.") (internal
citations omitted)).
285. Before Daimler, circuit courts were split as to whether compliance
with business registration or agent designation statutes subjected a defendant to
personal jurisdiction. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharms. L.L.C., No. 14-508-
LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *9 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015). See also Kevin D. Benish,
Pennoyer's Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and General Jurisdiction After
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1611-13 (2015) (citing the Third and
Eighth Circuits' holding that consent-by-registration is constitutional; citing the Second
and Ninth Circuits' support for the Third and Eighth Circuits in dicta; citing the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' holding that consent-by-registration is
unconstitutional; citing that the Sixth, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal
have yet to take a position); Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 229. For cases that held compliance with
registration statutes could amount to valid consent to personal jurisdiction, see Holloway
v. Wright & Morrissey; Inc., 739 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir. 1984); Spiegel v. Schulmann,
604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (dicta); Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir.
1991); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (8th Cir. 1990);
King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011) (dicta). For cases that
held that compliance with a state registration statute cannot be the basis for finding
consent to general jurisdiction, see Cossaboon v. Me. Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir.
2010); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs. Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971); Siemer v. Learjet
Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd.,
916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990); Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286,
1293 (11th Cir. 2000).
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found that registering to do business and appointing an agent did not
create a separate jurisdictional basis, but is only a procedural mechanism
for ensuring service of process.286 At least one jurisdiction, the District
of Columbia, has a statute that explicitly states that the registration of an
agent for service does not create a mechanism for personal
jurisdiction.28 7
Since Daimler, courts have remained split on the issue, but the only
circuit court since Daimler to consider the issue rejected the notion of
state-based consent to jurisdiction through registration and designating a
registered agent. In its decision, however, the Second Circuit held
286. Monestie, supra note 282, at 1369 (citing Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc.,
216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966
F.2d 179, 180-84 (5th Cir. 1992); Leonard v. USA Petrol. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882, 888-
89 (S.D. Tex. 1993); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277-78
(D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Second Jud. Dist.
Court ex rel. Cty. of Washoe, 1 P.3d 963, 965-68 (Nev. 2000); Byham v. Nat'l Cibo
House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1965); Wash. Equip. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Concrete
Placing Co., Inc., 931 P.2d 170, 172-73 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)).
287. D.C. CODE § 29-104.14 (2011) ("The designation or maintenance in the District
of a registered agent shall not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the
represented entity in the District.").
288. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 626 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[U]pon
our examination of the applicable Connecticut law, we conclude that by registering to
transact business and appointing an agent under the Connecticut statutes-which do not
speak clearly on this point-Lockheed did not consent to the state courts' exercise of
general jurisdiction over it. A more sweeping interpretation would raise constitutional
concerns prudently avoided absent a clearer statement by the state legislature or the
Connecticut Supreme Court."). The court in Brown also noted that a "carefully drawn
state statute that expressly required consent to general jurisdiction as a condition on a
foreign corporation's doing business in the state, at least in cases brought by state
residents, might well be constitutional," essentially overturning Vera v. Republic of Cuba,
91 F. Supp. 3d 561, 566-67, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that the defendant corporation
consented to jurisdiction for purposes of responding to subpoenas through registering to
do business). Id. at 641.
For other post-Daimler cases finding that consent by registration is not valid, see,
for example, Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp. 3d 734, 750 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (noting that other district courts in the 7th Circuit have similarly held); Display
Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 176 (D.N.J. 2016) (finding that a Wisconsin
corporation did not consent to general jurisdiction of New Jersey by registering to do
business and appointing an agent, both because the statute did not expressly state the
company was subjecting itself to jurisdiction, and because more recent, contact-based
jurisprudence has called into question the consent by registration theory); Lanham v.
Pilot Travel Ctrs., No. 03:14-CV-01923-HZ, 2015 WL 5167268, at *11 (D. Or. Sept. 2,
2015) (finding that registration pursuant to Oregon's foreign business registration statute
did not provide a basis for consent to jurisdiction, given that the statute did not mention
jurisdiction); Keeley v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 415-CV-00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4
(E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (rejecting consent to jurisdiction simply because a company was
registered with Missouri and required to appoint an agent for service of process);
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharis., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D. Del. 2014) ("In
light of the holding in Daimler, the court finds that Mylan's compliance with Delaware's
registration statutes-mandatory for doing business within the state-cannot constitute
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open the possibility that "a carefully drawn state statute" that expressly
required consent to general jurisdiction in exchange for a foreign
corporation's doing business in the state, at least in cases brought by
state residents, might well be constitutional.2 89
In fact, Pennsylvania has a statute-and it appears to be the only
state with such a statute-that specifically provides in its long-arm
statute for general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that
has received "qualification as a foreign corporation" under the state
registration statute.290 The courts in Pennsylvania have applied the
statute according to its language.291 Although it has not been interpreted
since Daimler, it might fit into the type of statute contemplated in Brown.
consent to jurisdiction, and the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Sternberg [v.
O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1116 (Del. 1988) (holding that compliance with registration
statutes creates personal jurisdiction)] can no longer be said to comport with federal due
process."), af'd on diferent grounds, Acorda Theurapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), (finding specific jurisdiction); Fiduciary Network, L.L.C.
v. Buehler, No. 3:15-CV-0808, 2015 WL 2165953 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2015).
For cases finding registration constitutes consent, see, for example, Mitchell v.
Eli Lilly and Co., 159 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977-79 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (finding Missouri's
business registration statute and requirement of agent for service of process equated to
consent for general personal jurisdiction, and stating that neither Daimler nor Goodyear
addressed consent as a separate basis); Acorda Theurapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 588
("Daimler does not eliminate consent as a basis for a state to establish general jurisdiction
over a corporation which has appointed an agent for service of process in that state, as is
required as part of registering to do business in that state, noting that Daimler did not
address consent"), af'd on diferent grounds, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming
the district court's finding of specific jurisdiction); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan
Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 468 (D.N.J. 2015) (finding registration under New Jersey
business statute constituted consent to be sued, even in light of Daimler, and noting that
Daimler suggests consent is a separate basis of jurisdiction); Forest Labs., 2015 WL
880599, at *10 (finding Daimler did not affect rule that registering to do business
constituted consent to personal jurisdiction, and that the Delaware Supreme Court
decision in Sternberg v. O'Neil is still good law).
289. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 626. Similarly, another federal case suggests that a state
could theoretically have a corporation's consent to jurisdiction if due process was
satisfied, but also finding that simply registering and naming an agent does not satisfy
due process. See Keeley, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4.
290. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (2016).
291. See Eagle Traffic Control, Inc. v. James Julian, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1251, 1256
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
[Plaintiff] bases general personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] on the
ground that it is qualified to do business within this state as a foreign
corporation. Pennsylvania's personal jurisdiction statute expressly grants
jurisdiction in such an instance . . . . The bottom line is
that Pennsylvania's long arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction when a
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In addition to the fact that it may be most efficient for Congress to
enact such a statute rather than individual states, a federal statute might
also survive constitutional challenges that state legislation might not,
especially where the foreign corporations are domiciled outside of the
United States.292 For example, some might argue that allowing states to
legislate and potentially impede commerce with corporations domiciled
abroad may be unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause.293
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in 1910 found that it was a violation
of the Commerce Clause for a state to impose limitations on foreign
corporations doing business within the state, and that only Congress
could do so.2 94
Even if such is not prohibited under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, some might challenge state laws requiring consent due to other
federal-related concerns. One example is implied federal preemption.29 5
Although states primarily regulate business, whether domestic or foreign,
Congress has increasingly "occupied the field" 296 when it comes to
292. I take no personal view on whether states can constitutionally enact their own
consent statutes for TNCs doing business in the states, and a full analysis of the
constitutionality of such state action is outside the scope of this article. The point I am
trying to make is that a federal statute would not be as vulnerable to constitutional
challenges.
293. The Dormant Commerce Clause does not expressly exist in the text of the United
States Constitution. It is, rather, a doctrine deduced by the U.S. Supreme Court and
lower courts from the actual Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which provides
Congress with the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and "the several
states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) ("[T]he Clause has long been understood to have a
'negative' aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or
burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.") (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502
U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876)). Some scholars question
whether the Dormant Commerce Clause actually exists as a prohibition on state action.
See, e.g., Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of "Privileges or Immunities ": Saenz
v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 295, 309 (1999) (noting
critiques by Supreme Court Justices of the Dormant Commerce Clause as an "over-broad
and illegitimate constraint on state power"); S. Mohsin Reza, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno:
An Escape from the Dormant Commerce Clause Quagmire?, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 1229,
1251 (2006) (discussing Justice Thomas' and Justice Scalia's criticisms of the Dormant
Commerce Clause); Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not "Overrule " the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REv. 153, 163 (2005).
294. See Int'l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 10849 (1910); see also supra note
45. Interestingly, none of the cases discussed above cite to that case. It is unclear why.
295. Preemption is the "principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal
law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation." Preemption,
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Implied preemption is determined by
"inquiring whether Congress has occupied a particular field with the intent to supplant
state law or whether state law actually conflicts with federal law." Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 532 (1992).
296. Field preemption is a form of implied preemption where the federal government
indicates it intends to occupy a specific regulatory field, and thus any conflicting state
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interstate and foreign commerce.2 97 Moreover, some courts might strike
down state consent statutes under the foreign affairs doctrine,298 with
courts ultimately finding that only Congress can impose conditions
requiring a non-U.S based corporation to consent to general personal
jurisdiction in exchange for doing business.
Regardless of whether individual states may or may not be able to
constitutionally require such consent as a condition for doing business
due to the commerce clause or foreign preemption, there is no
constitutional rule that prevents the federal government from requiring
such consent.299 In fact, the Commerce Clause expressly allows this.
The Commerce Clause clearly gives Congress the power to "Regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations."3 00  Additionally, having Congress
enact such a statute would not raise the same issues related to federal
preemption and the foreign affairs doctrine that are raised when a state
enacts such laws. Moreover, limiting general jurisdiction to federal
causes of action would allow courts to rest more assured that Congress
and the executive branch have considered foreign policy implications.
A federal statute could simply state that all businesses domiciled
abroad that are "doing business" in the United States need to register
with each state where it does business, provide an agent for service
(which they typically already have to do), 301 and explicitly provide that,
by doing so, the foreign corporation is consenting to general personal
jurisdiction for any federal claims that provide for extraterritorial
law could be struck down. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509 (1956). See
also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) ("[U]nder the
Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, "'any state law,
however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is
contrary to federal law, must yield.'"") (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138
(1988) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962))).
297. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012); Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-531 (2012); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (holding that
Congress can regulate any commercial ctivity that has an effect on interstate trade).
298. Under the foreign affairs doctrine, state laws that could affect foreign affairs are
invalid because the power to manage foreign affairs is reserved by the federal
government. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
299. See generally Benish, supra note 285.
300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
301. All businesses, including foreign, domestic, incorporated, and unincorporated,
typically have to register with each state in which they do business and establish a
registered agent, regardless of whether the business is incorporated in that state. See
Caron Beesley, Selling into the U.S. as a Foreign Business: Should You Incorporate
Your Business Here?, SMALL Bus. Assoc.: STARTING A BUSINESS (last updated Aug. 18,
2015), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/selling-us-foreign-business-should-you-incorporate-
your-business-here. It seems that only foreign businesses which sell exclusively online
or through a U.S. wholesaler are exempt from the general requirement for business
registration. Id.
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application.3 0 2  Such explicit language would provide fair notice to
foreign corporations that hey are subject to the general jurisdiction of
U.S. courts where a cause of action exists, alleviating due process
concerns.
Some might question whether requiring consent is true consent,
leading to Constitutional Due Process concerns. One scholar has given a
very in-depth analysis and remains very skeptical about whether states
can require foreign corporations to consent to jurisdiction through
registration statutes, noting that consent through registration has none of
the hallmarks of actual consent, raising issues of fundamental fairness.303
Although coerced consent would remain an issue under the proposed
statute, a federal statute raises fewer concerns in this regard. This is
because foreign corporations do not have any constitutional rights before
they are haled into a U.S. court.304  Therefore, they do not have due
process rights in the same way a U.S. business has due process rights.
Moreover, coerced consent concerns have been raised in the context of
businesses within one U.S. state having to consent to the jurisdiction of
another U.S. state, not a TNC seeking permission to do business in the
United States.305  To the degree there are resulting concerns about
whether the proposed statute would "chill" TNCs from doing business in
the United States, such is unlikely. This is because TNCs stand to gain
enormously from doing business in the United States, and ultimately, the
types of suits that could be brought are few, and limited only to those
"bad apples" that violate human rights.
A federal statute has the additional benefit of satisfying Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(1)(C), which provides that the service of summons establishes
personal jurisdiction over the defendant when "authorized by a federal
statute."306 The statute should also indicate that for a claim arising under
federal law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) applies if the foreign corporation is
doing business equally throughout the United States, allowing any
federal court to assert jurisdiction over any corporation domiciled.abroad
302. Alternatively, Congress could enact a statute allowing states to enact their own
statutes to require foreign corporations doing business within the state to consent to
general personal jurisdiction. For example, Congress has previously authorized state
actions that might otherwise have been deemed preempted. See, e.g., Sudan
Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA) of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 21 Stat. 2516
(2007) (authorizing states to divest from companies that conduct business operations in
Sudan). For a discussion of the constitutionality of the SADA and similar legislation, see
Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 823 (2009).
For the reasons discussed herein, however, I believe a federal statute is more efficient,
more consistent, and more likely to satisfy due process and other constitutional concerns.
303. Monestie, supra note 282, at 1380-90, 1398.
304. See Simowitz, supra note 10, at 31-32.
305. Monestie, supra note 282, at 1380-90, 1398.
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
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in such circumstances.30 7 It is important to note that although the
Supreme Court has not decided the issue, lower circuit courts have held
that it is constitutional to aggregate contacts for purposes of personal
jurisdiction against a foreign defendant pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment.3 0 8  Thus, if the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
applies to foreign defendants in federal causes of action rather than the
Fourteenth's Due Process Clause, asserting jurisdiction only for federal
claims may best withstand scrutiny.309
1. What Constitutes "Doing Business?"
There is no specific definition for what constitutes "doing
business," and courts typically determine "doing business" on a case-by-
case basis.310 Congress could continue to allow individual states or
courts to determine what "doing business" means, but that might raise
due process concerns. Alternatively, Congress could provide a definition
for "doing business.". Congress could define "doing business" for
purposes of the statute in a myriad of ways, setting forth a minimum
monetary amount for transactions, trade, or sales, or the establishment of
one or more offices, whether directly or through a subsidiary. But
307. In relevant part, the rule reads:
(2) Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises
under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant if:
(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of
general jurisdiction; and
(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution
and laws.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
308. See, e.g., Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985)
(noting that where a federal court has federal question jurisdiction over a case, as
opposed to diversity jurisdiction, the court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant is not
limited to the forum state's personal jurisdiction over the defendant; rather, the Fifth
Amendment allows for nationwide personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has
sufficient nationwide contacts) (citing Johnson Creative Arts v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743
F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984) ("'[Mlinimum contacts' with a particular district or state for
purposes of personal jurisdiction is not a limitation imposed on the federal courts in a
federal question case by due process concerns. The Constitution does not require the
federal districts to follow state boundaries.")). See also Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer,
762 F.2d 290, 293-95 (3d Cir. 1985).
309. See, e.g., Simowitz, supra note 10, at 6, 32 (noting arguments that the Fifth
Amendment applies to federal courts' assertion of general personal jurisdiction, which is
arguably less restrictive).
310. WOLTERS KLUWER, SPECIFIC "DOING BUSINESS ACTIVITIES" THAT AFFECT THE
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Congress should be sure to include that doing business means conducting
such business through a subsidiary or similar entity.
2. Expanded Jurisdiction is Not Unprecedented
Such expansive personal jurisdiction is not unprecedented.
Congress has pending legislation, the Foreign Manufacturers Legal
Accountability Act (FMLAA), which attempts to do something similar to
what is being recommended here: requiring foreign manufacturers that
do business in the United States to register to do business, appoint an
agent, and consent to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts.31 '
In addition, the Institute of International ,Law, a well-respected and
Nobel-prize winning international legal organization, has suggested
similarly expansive jurisdiction. It enacted a resolution on August 30,
2015, which provides for universal civil jurisdiction over defendants,
either where no other State has a stronger connection with the claim, or
"even though one or more other States have such stronger connections,
such victims do not have available remedies in the courts of any other
such State."3 12
Of course, it should be noted that 'such expanded jurisdiction is not
quite as expansive as it sounds because there are a limited number of
claims that include extraterritorial conduct.3 13 Moreover, courts would
still have the doctrine of forum non conveniens3 14 available to dismiss
those cases where, even though the harm occurred abroad, courts have
good reason to believe are better litigated in a more convenient forum
other than the United States.
311. Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act (FMLAA) of 2015, H.R. 3304,
114th Cong. (2015). For a discussion of this bill, see Press Release, Am. Assoc. for Just.,
AAJ Applauds Introduction of Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act (July 29,
2015). The FMLAA, if enacted, would require foreign manufactures that do business in
the United States (through importation of goods) to register their business, appoint an
agent, and consent o the jurisdiction of U.S. courts; similar legislation would require all
businesses that do business in the United States register and consent to personal
jurisdiction. Id.
312. Inst. of Int'l L., 1 Res. En., Universal Civil Jurisdiction with Regard to
Reparation for International Crimes (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.andreasbucher-
law.ch/images/stories/res-iil-en-universal civil jurisdiction.pdf.
313. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2332-33 (2012); Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012). See
supra Part II.A for a discussion of the ATS.
314. This doctrine allows courts to dismiss a case, even where it can assert
jurisdiction, on the basis that another jurisdiction is ostensibly more '"convenient" for the
parties and witnesses. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1947).
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B. A Statutory Enactment Would Provide for an Even Playing Field for
U.S. Corporations.
Allowing for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations that
conduct substantial and continuous business in the United States could
actually be good for U.S. corporations, because it would create an even
playing field for U.S. corporations. Under current personal jurisdiction
rules, only those corporations incorporated or headquartered in the
United States can be sued under the ATS, ATA, and the TVPA. Yet,
transnational corporations that lso conduct business in the United States
and gain enormous benefit from operating in the United States-some
perhaps that do more business than U.S.-based corporations-now no
longer have to worry about being sued under these same statutes because
U.S. courts cannot assert personal jurisdiction over them for the same
violations. This means that foreign corporations not only have less
exposure from lawsuits but will have to expend less and invest less
money in human rights compliance than U.S. corporations. This puts
those foreign corporations that otherwise do business in the United States
at a competitive edge.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued for narrow jurisdiction partly
because such narrow jurisdiction would provide certainty and clarity,
which she felt was important out of fairness to foreign corporations.3 15
Providing for broad general personal jurisdiction where a transnational
corporation does business provides the same level of certainty and
clarity.
C. Comity and Foreign Relations are not Substantial Impediments.
Justice Ginsburg, in her Daimler opinion, argues that broad personal
jurisdiction poses comity and foreign relations concerns as one
justification for limiting general personal jurisdiction.1 There should be
little question that it would be best for the United States, Canada, and
Europe to move toward equally broad general personal jurisdiction over
TNCs in order to ensure remedies for individual victims, for consistency
in the enforcement of judgments, and to allay U.S. lawmakers' and
judges' concerns of comity and foreign relations. However, even if the
United States took this approach on its own, concerns of comity and
foreign relations, although important, should not be substantial
impediments. This is especially the case because the expansive personal
jurisdiction this article advocates would only apply in those situations
315. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
316. Id. at 763.
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where Congress has provided for causes of action, ostensibly after taking
foreign relations into consideration.
First, it is important to address the Restatement (Third) of The
Foreign Relations Law of the United States' (Restatement) view on what
this article has deemed "personal jurisdiction" but what the Restatement
calls "adjudicative jurisdiction," 317  given its recognition as an
informative legal treatise on international law. Arguably, the
Restatement's authoritative view on the subject should provide assurance
to Congress and policymakers that what this article is proposing is within
the bounds of what the Restatement recognizes as authoritative
international law on the subject, and ease comity and foreign relations
concerns to a large extent.
The Restatement allows assertions of adjudicative (personal)
jurisdiction and considers such reasonable both where, inter alia, the
defendant consents to such jurisdiction and where the defendant
"regularly carries on business."3 18 The greater restrictions, from a comity
perspective, arguably involve causes of action for extraterritorial
conduct, or what the Restatement terms "jurisdiction to prescribe."319
However, the Restatement allows lawmakers to enact causes of action
for extraterritorial conduct where actions are directed against the nation's
security320 or are in the interests of its citizens.321 Importantly, the
Restatement allows for prescriptive jurisdiction for those offenses that
are recognized as of universal concern, such as violations of customary
international law.322 Moreover, such prescriptions are not limited to
criminal law, but allows for civil actions that provide a remedy or
restitution for these offenses.323 Thus, providing for general personal
jurisdiction over those TNCs consenting to general personal jurisdiction
for the privilege of doing business in the United States for claims of
extraterritorial violations of international law-such as international
human rights violations, terrorism, and human trafficking (among
potential others)-does not violate international law and is seen as a
317. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
421 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
318. Id. at §§ 421(2)(g)-(h) (discussing whether the person has consented to
jurisdictional exercise and "regularly carries on business in the state").
319. Id. at §§ 402-04.
320. Id. at § 402(3).
321. Id. at §§ 402(2)-(3). However, such an action must be reasonable. Id. at § 403.
Although "reasonableness" takes into consideration a variety of factors, including
whether another nation has an interest in regulating the conduct and the likelihood of
conflict with another nation, id. at § 403(2), this reasonableness tandard also allows
lawmakers to consider legal and economic systems and the degree to which the
desirability of such recognition is generally accepted. Id. at §§ 403(2)(c), (e).
322. Id. at § 404.
323. Id. at ct. (b).
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proper exercise 'of authority. Moreover, given that Congress has
provided for claims involving extraterritorial conduct, one can argue that
Congress (and the executive through the signing of such bills) has taken
potential conflicts with other nations into account before enacting such
legislation.
Second, as discussed above in Part IV.A., EU countries protect their
own corporations from expansive jurisdiction by other EU countries, but
do not protect corporations that are domiciled outside an EU country
(such as in the United States) from expansive jurisdiction.3 24  Thus,
transnational corporations domiciled in the United States are subjected to
actually fairly broad jurisdiction in numerous European countries.32 5
They are similarly exposed to broader jurisdictional rules in Canada.326
Thus, U.S. courts' assertion of jurisdiction over EU-domiciled
transnational corporations should not pose comity problems with nations
in Europe or Canada.
Third, the United States has allowed foreign corporations without
headquarters in the United States to be sued in U.S. courts for decades
without serious foreign policy repercussions. Moreover, if comity was a
major concern, one would think that Congress would have limited
general personal jurisdiction by statute, but it never did.
Finally, as discussed above, by limiting general personal
jurisdiction to federal causes of action, courts can be more assured that
comity implications of subjecting foreign corporations to general
jurisdiction of U.S. courts has been considered and weighed by Congress
and the executive branch.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Congress has allowed a cause of action for extraterritorial
violations of international human rights law for over two hundred years
through the Alien Tort Statute, never having amended nor restricted the
statute. It has also provided causes of action for terrorism-related claims
and human trafficking. Although it was never easy to assert general
personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation even under International
Shoe, the U.S. Supreme Court's move to restrictive personal jurisdiction
over transnational businesses in Goodyear and Daimler greatly impedes
victims of human rights-related violations from seeking and obtaining
remedies pursuant to these Congressionally-provided causes of action.
Such restrictions mean less access to remedy for victims of human rights
abuses, even as transnational businesses gain enormous financial benefits
324. See supra note 185.
325. See supra note 186.
326. See supra note 24.
680 [Vol. 121:3
EXPANDING GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
from transnational operations, typically at the expense of victims in
developing countries with weak judicial systems that host such
businesses. Moreover, these restrictions are unfair given how
transnational business is structured and operates in the modem world.
Given this unfairness, Congress should act to ensure courts have personal
jurisdiction over transnational businesses doing business in the United
States so that victims can pursue causes of action for extraterritorial
conduct that Congress has, in its wisdom, provided. Europe and Canada
should take similar action, but such action is especially critical in the
United States, where victims can more easily seek and obtain remedies
for such harms. Moreover, such jurisdictional expansion would create an
even playing field for all transnational businesses operating throughout
the world, several of whom do substantial business in the United States.
Current jurisdictional rules are simply no match for the complex
manner in which transnational businesses are structured and operate.
Countries where transnational businesses operate need to develop true
transnational jurisdictional rules. Congress enacting a broad general
personal jurisdiction statute is a first, but important, step in this direction.
'I'
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